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CAN BE NO SUCH THING AS AN INDISSOLUBLE PARTNERSHIP.' "

'

Since the development of the Uniform Partnership Act [UPA],5 one of the
more settled features of American partnership law is that any partner has the
absolute power to dissolve a general partnership. This very considerable power
may be effectuated through a mere expression of will to dissolve' and is exercisable regardless of cause or any agreement that may attempt to restrict the
power. 4 The only requirement to dissolve a general partnership- is a single
partner's clear communication of this intention to other partners.
Partnership law generally encourages the development of agreements regulating the relationship among partners. 6 This policy is evidenced by the numerous provisions of the UPA that are applicable only in the absence of an
agreement among the partners. 7 Indeed, UPA provisions that supersede contrary

1. Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. 513, 538 (N.Y. 1822) (emphasis in original).
2. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT (1914) (all references will be to the 1914 text) (49 states have
adopted the UPA).
3. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31(l)(b), (2). Ideally, the expression of will is clear and
unequivocal,

although a number of courts have inferred the expression from the course of conduct

of a particular partner. See, e.g , Straus v. Straus, 254 Minn. 234, 243, 94 N.W.2d 679, 685-86
(1959) (filing a suit for dissolution may itself be a sufficient expression of will to constitute an act
of dissolution in contravention of the partnership agreement); Cracco v. Cracco, 25 A D.2d 660,
660, 268 N.Y.S.2d 97, 98 (1966) ("The actions of defendants.. in refusing to continue to pay
plaintiff, who had become disabled. . .his share in the proceeds of the partnership and in refusing
to account to plaintiff as provided in the partnership agreement manifested an unequivocal election
by defendants to dissolve the partnership at will."); Timmerman v. Timmerman, 272 Or 613,
625, 538 P.2d 1254, 1260 (1975) (cessation of participation in partnership activities dissolved partnership at will).
In addition to dissolution by the express will of a single partner, which is the subject of this
article, dissolution may be accomplished through a judicial decree, the termination of an agreed
term or undertaking, the unanimous agreement of partners, the expulsion of a partner, an event
that makes it unlawful to carry on the business of the partnership, the death of a partner, or the
bankruptcy of the partnership or any partner. See UNIP. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31-32.
Some jurisdictions provide special rules for mining partnerships. See generally A. BROMBERG, CRANE
AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 27 (1968);

H.

REUSCHLEIN & W.

GREGORY,

HANDBOOK ON THE

LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP !i 263 (1979); Kiesling, Mining Partnerships, 12 BAYLOR L. REV.
103 (1960); Jones, Mining Partnerships in Texas, 12 TEX. L. REV. 410 (1934); McKay, Joint Ventures
and Mining Partnerships, 7 KAN. L. REV. 22 (1958). These rules may affect the dissolvability of
mining partnerships. See H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra, § 263, at 432. The special considerations involved in mining ventures are beyond the scope of this article.
4. If the dissolution is in contravention of an existing partnership agreement, it may be
"wrongful." Under such circumstances, the dissolution, although effective, may lead to the imposition of certain economic sanctions against the dissolving partner. See infra notes 11-14 and
accompanying text.
5. The dissolvability of limited partnerships is not treated in this article.
6. One commentator has used the term "suppletory" to describe the approach of the UPA
to the regulation of partnership affairs. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 9
(1976). The great deference shown agreements by the UPA has influenced some recent reforms of
the law of corporations designed to permit shareholders in close corporations to reach agreements
as if they were partners. See infra note 181.
7. See, e.g., UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 8 (Partnership Property); id. 5 9 (Partner Agent of
Partnership as to Partnership Business); id. § 18 (Rules Determining Rights and Duties of Partners);

id. 5 27 (Assignment of Partner's Interest); id. § 37 (Right to Wind Up); id. § 38 (Rights of
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agreements are exceptions rather than the rule. The potential conflict between
the dual policies of free dissolvability' and freedom of contract materializes when
an individual partner dissolves a partnership prematurely and breaches an agreement previously accepted by that partner.9 Under such circumstances, the policy
of free dissolvability prevails and the agreement largely is subordinated to the
desires and interests of the partner choosing dissolution."'
Dissolution in contravention of an agreement, however, is not without costs
for the- dissolving partner. Such costs arise because the right to dissolve is not
coextensive with the power to so act." The significance of the "right versus
power" distinction is seen in the economic consequences of a premature, and
therefore wrongful, dissolution. Although effective, a wrongful dissolution subjects the breaching partner both to liability in damages' 2 and to the imposition
of secondary sanctions. These sanctions include an inability to compel a liquidation of partnership assets,:' and a discounted, or even deferred, account
settlement. 14
With the possible exception of the loss of the liquidation right,'" the economic
sanctions imposed on a partner causing a wrongful dissolution often are not
significant." Even in those circumstances in which the "cost" of a premature
Partners to Application of Partnership Property); id. S 40 (Rules for Distribution); id. S 42 (Rights
of Retiring or Estate of Deceased Partner When the Business is Continued); id. § 43 (Accrual of
Actions).
8. In this article, the phrase "free dissolvability" is used to describe the power of a partner
to dissolve a partnership even though that action is in contravention of the partnership agreement.
"Dissolution" is a term of art under the UPA and means a "change in the relation of the partners
caused by any partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on as distinguished from the winding
up of the business." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT § 29.
9. In this article, the phrase "fixed term partnership" encompasses partnerships formed
pursuant to agreements that either establish fixed terms or define specific undertakings. This usage
is consistent with that of the UPA. See Id. § 31.
10. For a discussion of the pitfalls of normal partnership dissolutions, see Hillman, Misconduct
as a Basis for Excluding or Expelling a Partner: Effecting Commercial Divorce and Securing Custody of the
Business, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 527, 531-36 (1983).
11. See, e.g., Williams v. Hildebrand, 220 Ark. 202, 204-05, 247 S.W.2d 356, 358 (1952);
Straus v. Straus, 254 Minn. 234, 244, 94 N.W.2d 679, 686 (1959); Napoli v. Domnitch, 18 A.D.2d
707, 708, 236 N.Y.S.2d 549, 551-52 (1962), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 508, 147 N.E.2d 623, 248 N.Y.S.2d
228 (1964); Campbell v. Miller, 274 N.C. 143, 150-51, 161 S.E.2d 546, 551 (1968); see also
McCollum v. McCollum, 67 S.W.2d 1055, 1056 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (pre-UPA case indicating,
"[tihe right to dissolve may not exist but the power to dissolve always exists."). But see Williams
v. Terebinski, 24 Ohio Misc. 53, 57, 261 N.E.2d 920, 923 (1970) (concluding, incorrectly, that
notice of dissolution by defendant partner "was no more than an expression on the part of [defendant] of his desire to have the partnership dissolved, which required under the circumstances plaintiff's
consent to such dissolution.").
12. UNIF. PARTNERSHn AcT 5 38(2)(c).

13. Id. S 38(1), (2)(b).
14. The UPA permits the partners who have not caused a wrongful dissolution to elect to
continue the partnership for the agreed term. If they so elect, they may either settle the account
of the dissolving partner or defer payment and secure the former partner's account by a bond. In
settling the account, the value of partnership goodwill is disregarded. See id. § 38(2).
15. For a discussion of the importance of the liquidation right, see Hillman, supra note 10,
at 531-34.
16. See infra notes 126-34 and accompanying text. Sanctions also may be established by agreement. See infra notes 157-78 and accompanying text.
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dissolution is high, the position of the disgruntled partner may be vastly superior
to that of the dissatisfied minority shareholder, the partner's counterpart in a
close corporation." A partner, unlike a shareholder, is permitted the luxury of
engaging in a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether the costs, if any, resulting from the act of dissolution will outweigh the benefits to be derived from
such an action. A minority shareholder in a closely held corporation does not
have such a choice.'
The position of the UPA on free dissolvability of fixed term partnerships
is grounded firmly in the law of agency."' The authority of an agent to act on
behalf of a principal is based upon that principal's assent. Revocation of assent
by the principal terminates the authority of the agent. Since the authority of
partners to act for each other is based upon these seemingly straightforward
principles of agency, it follows that the withdrawal of assent by one partner
must revoke the authority of others. Under this theory, the agency model dictates the free dissolvability of partnerships.
Although the application of agency precepts to partnership dissolutions may
appear logical, the principle of free dissolvability of partnerships is not without
the potential for controversy. Before the development of the UPA, American
authorities split on the dissolvability of a fixed term partnership by the unilateral
action of a single partner." ' The widespread adoption of the UPA has settled
the matter in virtually every American jurisdiction.2 ' However, one adopting
state, Arkansas, subsequently rejected this aspect of the UPA and now precludes
a partner from causing a dissolution "in contravention or violation of the agreement between the partners. ' '2 '" Louisiana, which has not adopted the UPA, does
not permit dissolution, without cause, of a fixed term partnership through a

17.
For a discussion of the relative stability of partnerships and close corporations, see Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence
of Partnerships and Close Corporations, 67 MINN. L. REv. 1 (1982).
18. Most statutes permit a voluntary corporate dissolution upon the vote of a certain percentage of shareholders. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1900 (West 1977) (50 percent); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (1975) (majority); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1001 (McKinney 1963) (two-thirds).
If the necessary share support is not forthcoming, a shareholder must seek an involuntary dissolution.
Traditionally, the grounds for such dissolution are narrowly defined, although there has been some
recent movement toward expanding these grounds. See infra notes 182-90 and accompanying text
19. See infra notes 40-55 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 32-37 and accompanying text.
21.
Seesupra note 2.
22. Arkansas adopted the UPA in 1941. See 1941 Ark. Acts 263. In so doing. it accepted
the UPA's provisions permitting dissolution by express will in contravention of a partnership agreement. However, the Arkansas law was amended in 1961 to preclude such dissolutions. See 1961
Ark. Acts 421. The amendment affected sections 29 and 31 of the UPA. See ARK. STAT. ANN. 5
65-129 (1980) (defining dissolution in a manner consistent with UPA § 29 but adding, "provided
that this change in the relation of the partners shall not effect a dissolution of the partnership in
contravention or violation of the agreement between the partners"); id. § 65-131 (1980) (omitting
as a cause of dissolution an expression of a partner's will to dissolve when that expression is in
contravention of the partnership agreement); see also Osborne v. Workman, 273 Ark. 538, 621
S.W.2d 478 (1981) (holding a partner does not have the power to dissolve a partnership when the
agreement permits dissolution only by mutual consent or operation of law).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss4/1
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unilateral expression of will.23 English, 24 French 5 and German laws follow a

law stands alone in permitting free
similar rule.2 6 In fact, American partnership
27
partnerships.
term
fixed
of
dissolvability
Although the issue seems settled in the United States, a recent decision
demonstrates some judicial squeamishness with the principle of free dissolvability. In Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., " s the First Circuit Court of
Appeals suggested that, at least under certain circumstances, a court may enjoin
the dissolution of a partnership and decree specific performance of the partnership agreement. Infusaid presents the occasion for a reexamination in this
article of the UPA's principle of free dissolvability of fixed term partnerships.
Part I of the article examines the development of, and rationale for, the

23. See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2821 (West 1985) ("If a partnership has been constituted
for a term, a partner may withdraw without consent of his partners prior to the expiration of the
term provided he has just cause arising out of the failure of another partner to perform an obligation.").
24. Subject to any agreement between the partners, a partnership is dissolved(a) If entered into for a fixed term, by the expiration of that term:
(b) If entered into for a single adventure or undertaking, by the termination of that
adventure or undertaking:
(c) If entered into for an undefined time, by any partner giving notice to the other
or others of his intention to dissolve the partnership.
English Partnership Act, 1890, 53 Vict., 5 32. See generally Moss v. Elphick, 1 K.B. 846 (1910)
(agreement providing for termination by mutual agreement only creates a fixed term partnership
for the joint lives of the partners and is not terminable upon notice by one of the partners); E.
SCAMMEL & R. BANKS, LINDLEY ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP 612-14 (1979); Milman, Partnerships
(3): Problems with Dissolution, 4 THE COMPANY LAw. 10 (1984); Milman, Partnerships (2): Domestic
Enforcement of Rights, 4 THE COMPANY LAW. 246 (1983).
25. Article 1844-7(5) of the French Civil Code provides several methods of terminating a
partnership, inclu'ding "anticipatory dissolution pronounced by the tribunal upon demand of one
of the members for valid reasons, especially in the event of nonperformance of his obligations by
one of the members, or of discord among the members paralyzing the operation of the company."
See H. DEVRIES, N. GALSTON & R. LOENING, MATERIALS ON THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 103 (3d
ed. 1979).
26. The German Commercial Code provides several methods of dissolving a commercial
partnership, including "by notice of termination and by judicial decision." THE GERMAN COMMERCIAL CODE S 131 (S. Goren & I. Forrester trans. 1979). Section 132 permits dissolution by
notice if the partnership was formed for an indefinite period. Id. 5 132. Section 133 governs
dissolution by decree:
(1) On the petition of a partner the dissolution of the partnership may be ordered without
notice by judicial decision before the expiration of the time fixed for its duration, or when
the partnership is formed fdr an indefinite duration, if there is an important reason therefore.
(2) Such a reason obtains, in particular, if another partner wilfully or through gross
negligence violates a substantial obligation incumbent upon him pursuant to the partnership
agreement, or when the performance of such an obligation becomes impossible.
(3) An agreement contrary to these provisions, by which the right of the partners to
demand the, dissolution of the partnership is excluded or limited, is void.
Id. § 133.
27. This has been described as a "peculiarity" of American partnership law. XIII INTERNATIONAL

28.

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAw

1-47.

739 F.2d 661 (1st Cir. 1984).
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rule of free dissolvability of partnerships. The analysis challenges the widely
held belief that free dissolvability is a necessary consequence of the law of
agency. Part II considers the problem of free dissolvability in light of criteria
largely ignored by the UPA, including efficiency, morality and fairness. This
portion of the discussion also offers an evaluation of the Infusaid decision. Part
III addresses the planning problems facing partners who desire to achieve a
measure of stability and demonstrates the limited options that may be employed
to achieve this effect. Part IV draws from the law of corporations and evaluates
the degree to which the dissolvability of partnerships and close corporations
should be governed by similar principles. Finally, Part V offers some suggestions
for the reform of the UPA's treatment of premature dissolutions.
The analysis will center on three potentially conflicting objectives of participants in small business enterprises.2 9 First, many partners perceive the need
for stability, or relative permanence of membership, in their ventures. Typically,
the greatest degree of consensus concerning this goal occurs at the beginning
of a partnership. After the hard lessons of business experience have been learned,
the benefits of stability, or continuation of the business by the initial cast of
participants, may be open to debate. Stability interests, of course, are advanced
when the premature dissolution of a partnership is rendered difficult, or even
impossible.
Second, liquidity interests are common to both shareholders and partners
who become dissatisfied with some aspects of their investments and prefer to
deploy their energies and resources elsewhere. Liquidity interests are most clearly
advanced when a policy of free dissolvability is combined with a method for
the withdrawing partner to secure a prompt and fair account settlement. Naturally, stability and liquidity interests may conflict, as often becomes apparent
with the passage of time.
Finally, some participants have, for want of a better term, risk-aversion
objectives. Often, these interests are of a defensive character and reflect concern
over the adverse effects of actions by other partners. Because partners are jointly
liable for debts of their partnerships, risk-aversion interests may dictate the
choice of alternative forms of business organization, such as corporations or
limited partnerships. Normally, risk is associated with a defensive fear of liability
and decline in net worth. A somewhat broader approach to risk, however, is
employed in this article. Control over the actions and identity of an agent may
be important as a method of increasing income through the realization of gains.
For purposes of this analysis, therefore, risk-aversion goals include general concerns over effects of the acts of an agent on the principal's wealth. " Frequently,
risk-aversion objectives are at best vaguely defined in the early period of a
partnership. Only later do actual and potential risks become clear.

29. Obviously, partners commonly have objectives other than those here listcd. Free dissolvability, however, most clearly affects the interests of stability, liquidity, and risk-aversion.
30. Perhaps "control objectives" would be preferable terminology.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol37/iss4/1
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I.

THE UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT AND FREE DISSOLVABILITY:
OF AGENTS,

PRINCIPALS,

A.

AND REVOCABLE POWERS

The Pre-UPA Debate

Prior to the development of the UPA, the ability of a single partner to
dissolve a fixed term partnership through a mere expression of will was open
to question. In the view of some, the need to provide individual partners with
a method of terminating unsatisfactory business relationships should be balanced
against the understandable expectations of other partners that agreements concerning duration would be enforced. 3 ' According to Justice Story, the interests
of the latter group were paramount because in many cases the remaining partners were left with no adequate remedy upon dissolution.3 2 He noted the issue

31.

Cases indicating that a fixed term partnership could not be dissolved by the express will

of a single partner include: Ferrero v. Buhlmeyer, 34 How. Pr. 33, 40 (1867) ("I have been
unable . . . to perceive any good reason why parties should not be allowed to enter a partnership
for a certain specified period of time; on the contrary, the present large and extended commercial
interests would seem to require the formation of such contracts. Nor do I perceive any good reason

why, having entered into such a contract, a party thereto should, before the expiration of the time,
be allowed to put an end to it by his own mere will and caprice, any more than he can be allowed

in such manner to put an end to any other contract."); Pearpoint & Lord v. Graham, 4 Wash.
C.C. 232, 234 (1818) (indicating in dictum, "now it is perfectly clear, that one partner can not,
by withdrawing himself from the association before the period stipulated between the partners for

its continuance, either dissolve the partnership, or extricate himself from the responsibilities of a
partner."); Cole v. Moxlcy, 12 W. Va. 730, 747 (1878) ("A partnership for a limited period,
cannot be dissolved at the mere pleasure of one of the partners, but may be dissolved for reasonable
cause."); see also Hannaman v. Karrick, 9 Utah 236, 33 P. 1039 (1893), aff'd on other grounds, 168
U.S. 328 (1897). In holding that a partner could not expel another partner and thereby gain control
of a profitable business, the Utah Supreme Court observed:
Where the partnership is merely at will, the right of one partner to terminate it must be
conceded; but where by agreement it is to continue for a time stipulated the party seeking
a dissolution before the expiration of the time ought in justice at least be required to act
in good faith, and at a reasonable time, and in a reasonable manner. . .. There seems to
be no good reason why a person should be allowed to commit a breach of his contract
in such case, while in all other cases of flagrant violation, not within the partnership, he
would be compelled to specifically perform if it was within his power to do so.
9 Utah at 241, 33 P. at 1041. In affirming on other grounds, the United States Supreme Court
expresed reservations over this aspect of the state court's opinion. 168 U.S. at 336. See infra notes
36-37 and accompanying text.
32. Whenever a stipulation is positively made that the partnership shall endure for a fixed
period, or for a particular adventure or voyage, it would seem to be at once inequitable
and injurious to permit any partner at his mere pleasure to violate his engagement and
thereby jeopardize, if not sacrifice, the whole objects of the partnership; for the success
of the whole undertaking may depend upon the due accomplishment of the adventure or
voyage .... It is no answer to say, that such a violation of the engagement may entitle
the injured partners to a compensation in damages; for, independently of the delay and
uncertainty attendant upon any such mode of redress, it is obvious, that the remedy may
be, nay, must be, in many cases utterly inadequate and unsatisfactory.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAw OF PARTNERSHIP § 275, at 439-40 (1859). He added: "If
there by any real and just ground for the abandonment of the partnership, a Court of Equity is
competent to administer suitable redress." Id. at 440.
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"would not seem, upon principle, to admit of any real doubt or difficulty" and
that a contrary position is "exceedingly artificial, if not indefensible.""
Regardless of the clarity of the principle articulated by Justice Story, American decisions prior to the development of the UPA split on the dissolvability
4
of a fixed term partnership through the expression of the will of a single partner.
Indeed, a number of courts, probably the majority, held that a single partner
could dissolve a partnership even if that act violated an agreement among the
partners."' This view was well stated by the Supreme Court in a pre-UPA case,
Karrick v. Hannaman,"' which stressed the need for mutual consent among partners in order for the partnership to function efficiently." Karrick, decided shortly
before the development of the UPA, provided strong support for the proponents
of free dissolvability of partnerships.
B.

The Issue Settled

Although Karrick provided substantial support for the free dissolvability proponents, the decision recognized that the issue was one on which "there has
been some difference of opinion.""' In an attempt to settle the matter, the
drafters of the UPA eventually accepted the position advanced in Karrick and
concluded that a dissolution in contravention of a partnership agreement, although perhaps wrongful, is nevertheless effective."' In support of this position,
the Official Comment to section 31 states, in part:
33. Id. at 440.
34. For cases supportive of Story's position, see supra note 31.
35. See, e.g , Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328 (1897) (discussed infra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text); Lapenta v. Lettieri, 72 Conn. 377, 383, 44 A. 730, 732 (1899) ("Whoever
acts as another's agent must base his authority on the other's assent. Such assent, if given, may
be retracted at any time, as regards future transactions. This doctrine in the law of agency rests
on reasons which apply fully to the partnership relation."); Skinner v. Dayton, 19 Johns. 513,
538 (N.Y. 1822) ("There can be no such thing as an indissoluble partnership.") (emphasis in
original); Solomon v. Kirkwood, 55 Mich. 256, 259, 21 N.W. 336, 337 (1884) (describing the
right of a partner to dissolve as "indefeasible"); Slemmer's Appeal, 58 Pa. 168 (1868).
36.
168 U.S. 328 (1897).
37. Id. at 334.
Every partnership creates a personal relation between the partners, rests upon their
mutual consent, and exists between them only ...
No partnership can efficiently or beneficially carry on its business without the mutual confidence and cooperation of all the
partners. Even when, by the partnership articles, they have covenanted with each other
that the partnership shall continue for a certain period, the partnership may be dissolved
at any time, at the will of any partner, so far as to put an end to the partnership relation
and to the authority of each partner to act for all; but rendering the partner who breaks
his covenant liable to an action at law for damages, as in other cases of breaches of
contract.
Id. The Court added:
We are not prepared, therefore, to assent to the opinion of the court below that a partnership for a definite term cannot be dissolved by one partner at his own will, and without
the consent of his copartner, within that time ..
But it is unnecessary to express an
opinion on this point, because, however it might be decided, it would not affect the
conclusion in favor of the plaintiff in the present case.
Id. at 336.
38. Id. at 336.
39. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 31, 38.
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The relation of partners is one of agency. The agency is such a

personal one that equity cannot enforce it even where the agreement
provides that the partnership shall continue for a definite time. The
power of any partner to terminate the relation, even though in4 doing
so he breaks a contract, should, it is submitted, be recognized. 11
The Official Comment, like much of the case law addressing this issue,
utilizes the imprecise concept, "personal," without specifically evaluating why
a personal relationship must be freely dissolvable. A closer examination of the
rationale reflected by the Official Comment reveals two distinct justifications
supporting free dissolvability of all partnerships. First, partnerships tend to be
small business ventures characterized by close or intimate working relationships
among their co-owners. Dissolution must be the option of any partner, for a
court is powerless to compel the restoration and maintenance of such a close,
"personal," business relationship against the will of any of the partners. Second,
partnerships are mutual agencies. Given the power of a single partner to act
on behalf of the group and thereby render all other members of the partnership
jointly liable, each partner must have the power to put an end to the relationship. An evaluation of the premise underlying free dissolvability requires
separate considerations of these two justifications.
1. The "Close"

Working Relationship Among Partners

Unquestionably, the typical partnership is a small business venture with
relatively few owners.4 ' Because working relationships are close, the partners
must trust each other. 42 Courts are reluctant to mandate the maintenance of
such trust relationships, and permitting any partner to dissolve a venture prematurely may seem desirable if the dissolving partner is willing to suffer the
economic consequences.
This argument for free dissolvability is consistent with the general reluctance
of courts to specifically enforce contracts either requiring personal services or
presenting problems of supervision that may undermine the efficacy of such
decrees.43 However, a personal service dimension is not dispositive of the issue
of whether free dissolvability should be a principle applied uniformly to all
partnerships. Not every partnership is characterized by intimate working relationships. Many partners assume passive positions within their ventures. If a
particular partnership does not depend upon cordial working relationships, why
should that partnership be dissolvable at the will of any of its partners? Further,
if free dissolvability is a necessary consequence of the intimacy of partnerships,
why are courts often reluctant to grant decrees of dissolution under section 32

40. The Comment adds: "The rights of the parties upon a dissolution in contravention of
the agreement are safeguarded by section 38(2)." See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
41. See Hillman, Power Shared and Power Denied: A Look at Participatory Rights in the Management
of General Partnerships, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 865, 865-66.
42. See, e.g., Ferrick v. Barry, 320 Mass. 217, 222, 68 N.E.2d 690, 694-95 (1946).
43. See infra notes 148-56 and accompanying text.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1985

9

Florida Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1985], Art. 1
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. XXXVII

of the UPA unless the friction between partners is "productive of serious and
permanent injury to the success and prosperity of the partnership?""
A comparison of partnerships with their corporate counterparts is instructive. 4 1 Close corporations, like most partnerships, have relatively few owners,
many or most of whom are active in their businesses." Shareholders in close
corporations enjoy, or suffer, working relationships similar in their character of
"intimacy" to those of partners in comparably sized ventures.4 7 Shareholders,
however, are not permitted to dissolve 4s their enterprises at will".4 If closeness
of working relationships was the sole criterion for developing standards for
dissolution, then both partnerships and close corporations should operate under
an identical standard. As the following discussion demonstrates, however, the
principal justification for the free dissolvability of partnerships lies not in the
assumed "intimacy" of working relationships, but rather in the mutual agency
character of partnerships.

44. Under the UPA, a court is authorized to decree dissolution of a partnership for any one
of a number of reasons. These include:
(a) A partner has been declared a lunatic in any judicial proceeding or is shown to be
of unsound mind,
(b) A partner becomes in any other way incapable of performing his part of the partnership contract,
(c) A partner has been guilty of such conduct as tends to affect prejudicially the carrying
on of the business,
(d) A partner wilfully or persistently commits a breach of the partnership agreement, or
otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating to the partnership business that it is not
reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership with him,
(e) The business of the partnership can only be carried on at a loss,
(f) Other circumstances [which] render a dissolution equitable.
UNIF.

PARTNERSHIP ACT

§ 32.

Courts reluctant to decree dissolution absent a showing of serious business harm presumably
feel that a business may be continued even though the relationships among its owners are less
than cordial. Indeed, some partnerships prosper even in the face of serious disputes among their
partners. See, e.g., Potter v. Brown, 328 Pa. 554, 195 A. 901 (1938). See generally Hillman, supra
note 10, at 545-47.
45. See infra notes 181-91 and accompanying text for a more fully developed comparison
46. For discussions of various definitions of close corporations, see F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 1.02 (2d ed. 1971); Hillman, supra note 17, at 63-65.
47. See, e.g., Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (describing a close
corporation as an "intimate" business venture and comparing it to a partnership); Donahue v.
Rodd Elec. Co., 367 Mass. 578, 592-93, 328 N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975) (referring to the "trust and
confidence which are essential" to close corporations and partnerships); Hetherington & Dooley,
llliquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63
VA. L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1977) (partnerships and close corporations are "founded by individuals who
have a virtually complete identity of interests and strong feelings of trust and confidence for one
another"); see also infra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
48. When applied to corporations, the meaning of "dissolution" may vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction. See generally A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 234-35 (1976).
49. See infra notes 182-87 and accompanying text.
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2.
a.

The Mutual Agency Character of a Partnership

The Traditional Analysis Reflected in the UPA: From the Perspective of
the "Principal"

A second justification for regarding the relations among partners as "personal" is the mutual agency character of a partnership. Each partner has the
capacity to act as an agent of the partnership and render other partners jointly
liable for acts taken within the scope of the partner's authority." Partners are
thus more dependent than shareholders on the sound judgment and goodwill
of each other. In this sense, the relationship of partners is intensely "personal."
The mutual agency character of a partnership provides a distinction, too
often overstated, between partnerships and close corporations. The "risk" of
a shareholder, unlike that of a partner, is limited to the amount that individual
has invested in a particular enterprise."' The risk of the partner for the acts
of other partners, on the other hand, is potentially unlimited. As a result, the
UPA elects to give any partner an expeditious method of terminating agency
powers even if that termination conflicts with an existing agreement establishing
a duration for the partnership.
As an alternative to dissolution by express will, dissolution may be accomplished by means of a judicial decree. This method of altering the legal relationship of partners, however, is neither certain in its outcome nor immediate
in its effect. Grounds must be established before a decree of dissolution may

50. The UPA provides:
(1) Every partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and the
act of every partner ... for apparently carrying on in the usual way the business of the
partnership . .. binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority
to act for the partnership in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is dealing
has knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently for the carrying on of the business of the
partnership in the usual way does not bind the partnership unless authorized by the other

partners.
(3) Unless authorized by the other partners or unless they have abandoned the business,

one or more but less than all the partners have no authority to:
(a) Assign the partnership property in trust for creditors or on the assignee's promise

to pay the debts of the partnership,
(b) Dispose of the good-will of the business,
(c) Do any other act which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business
of the partnership,
(d) Confess a judgment,
(e) Submit a partnership claim or liability to arbitration or reference.
-(4) No act of a partner in contravention of a restriction on authority shall bind the
partnership to persons having knowledge of the restriction.
AcT; see also UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT. 5 4 (providing as a rule of construction
that the law of agency shall apply under the UPA); id. S 15 (setting forth the nature of a partner's
joint or joint and several liability). See generally A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, §5 48-50; D. FESSLER
ALTERNATIVES TO INCORPORATION FOR PERSONS IN QUEST OF PROFIT 18-85 (1980); Hillman, supra
note 41, at 878-87.
51. The distinction, however, may be more theoretical than real. See infra notes 189-90 and
accompanying text.
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP
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be secured," and a review of litigation on this subject shows that a number
of courts are reluctant to dissolve prosperous partnerships absent a showing of
imminent business harm." Further, even if the partner desiring dissolution is
confident a decree may be obtained, a substantial delay may occur between
the filing of the petition and the issuance of the decree. During this period,
the partner seeking dissolution remains at risk for the actions of his or her
4
partners.1
By permitting prompt and unreviewable dissolution of a partnership, the
UPA advances risk-aversion objectives at the expense of previously bargained
for stability." Interestingly, the provisions of the Act regarding wrongful dissolution completely subordinate the liquidity interests of the dissolving partner,
at least in situations where the non-breaching partners choose to continue the
business and defer the settlement of accounts. This subordination of liquidity
interests when the business is continued may enhance otherwise discounted stability objectives of the continuing partners. If the business is not continued,
on the other hand, stability interests are disregarded.
Accordingly, the choice of free dissolvability reflects an assumption underlying the UPA that the risk-aversion interests of each partner are of paramount
importance. Such a conclusion, however, is neither an inevitable consequence
of the law of agency nor necessarily desirable as a matter of policy. As the
following discussion demonstrates, this aspect of the UPA bears reconsideration.
b.

An Alternative Analysis Not Reflected in the UPA:
From the Perspective of the "Agent"

Admittedly, an individual's status as an agent is revocable at the will of
the principal, and even a contract purporting to make an agency irrevocable
for a specified period cannot be specifically enforced. Under the classic model

See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 32.
See Hillman, supra note 10, at 539-52.
54. Generally, the date of dissolution is the same as that of the decree accomplishing the
dissolution. See, e.g , Zeibak v. Nasser, 12 Cal. 2d 1, 14-17, 82 P.2d 375, 382-83 (1938) (drawing
a distinction between the date of the misconduct requiring a decree of dissolution and the date
dissolution is actually ordered, and upholding an order decreeing dissolution as of the latter date);
Ben-Dashan v. Plitt, 58 A.D.2d 244, 248, 396 N.Y.S.2d 542, 546 (1977) (observing in dicta that
dissolution normally occurs on date of decree). A court, however, may decree dissolution as of an
earlier date. See, e.g., Vangel v. Vangel, 116 Cal. App. 2d 615, 626, 254 P.2d 919, 926 (1953)
(In upholding an order decreeing dissolution as of the date the introduction of evidcncc was completed, the court commented: "In some cases where the breach is serious and unequivocal
the misconduct really dissolves the partnership, the court decree merely giving legal effect thereto.
[But in other cases the misconduct] simply provides grounds for an application to a court of equity
for such relief."); Straus v. Straus, 254 Minn. 234, 242-43, 94 N.W.2d 679, 685 (1959) (the filing
of a petition for dissolution may have the effect of automatically dissolving a partnership); BenDashan, 58 A.D.2d at 248, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 546 (noting that dissolution generally occurs as of the
date of the decree but finding in this case that the effective date was the time of mutual consent).
55. In one sense, the partner faced with a premature dissolution is in a better position than
an agent whose authority has been terminated prematurely. The partner, unlike the agent, is at
least permitted to continue to possess partnership property for the agreed term. See UNiF. PARTNERSHiP ACT § 38(2); infra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
52.
53.
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of agency, the relationship between the parties is hierarchical, and the agent
'
acts, as a fiduciary, exclusively for the benefit of the principal.
7
considerations'
Taken this far, agency principles advancing risk-aversion
support the position of the UPA on free dissolvability of partnerships. The
analysis, however, ignores a special type of agency that is irrevocable. Referred
to at common law as an "agency coupled with an interest"'" and by the
Restatement (Second) of Agency as a "power given as a security,"" this type of
relationship represents an agency in name alone."" Partly because of the rigid
terminology underlying the rule,"' the nature of an interest that will render an
agency "irrevocable" has plagued courts and commentators and need not be
addressed in this article. 62 For present purposes, it is sufficient to observe that
:
when an agent possesses, for want of a better term, a proprietary interest" ' in
the subject of the agency, the relationship between "principal" and "agent"
is not hierarchical in character. In such a case, the principal is denied the
power to revoke the power of the agent to act.'
To a limited extent, the provisions of the UPA regarding wrongful dissolution equate partnerships with irrevocable agencies. The analogy, however, is
5
only partially carried forward by the Act. As was noted above, one of the
56. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1957) ("Agency is the fiduciary
relationship which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to another that the other
shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by the other so to act.") [hereinafter
cited as RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY]; id. S 13 ("An agent is a fiduciary with respect to
matters within the scope fo his agency.").
57. Again, use of the term "risk-aversion" may be somewhat misleading. See supra note 30
and accompanying text.
Gaussen v. Morton, 10 Barn. & Cress 731, 734 (K.B. 1830) (Lord Tenterden).
58. See, e.g.,
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 5 139 (1957).
60. Id. § 14H (1957); see also H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 3, § 47, at 97-98.
61. In an understatement, one court observed:
It is most difficult to frame an all-embracing definition of a power coupled with an interest. . .. Many of the authorities approach the subject as though it were a thesis, and
treat it in such an academic way as to be confusing. Much is said concerning what is
not a power coupled with an interest, with little attempt at exactness concerning what
actually constitutes the same.
Lane Mortgage Co. v. Crenshaw, 93 Cal. App. 411, 427, 269 P. 672, 679 (1928).
Professor Steffen commented: "The constructive thing to do, were it not too late, would be to
reword the rule, and substitute equity for interest, thus, 'a power coupled with an equity' may not
be revoked. This would at once preserve the essence of the rule, and end the uncertainty." R.
STEFFEN, AGENCY-PARTNERSHIP IN A NUTSHELL 44 (1977); see also E. LATrY, INTRODUCTION TO BustNESS ASSOCIATIONS 481 (1951) ("Focusing attention upon whether or not there was an 'interest'
coupled with the agency runs the risk that powers that ought to be revocable .. .may be held by
a court (having its eye solely on the traditional formula) to be irrevocable, and vice versa.").
62. See generally E. LArY, supra note 61; H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 3,
98; Seavey, Termination by Death of Proprietary Powers of Attorney, 31 YALE L.J. 283 (1922). The
landmark case, often criticized, is Hunt v. Rousmanier, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 174 (1823).
63. See infra note 84 and accompanying text.
64. Such a relationship permits the "agent" to advance his or her own interests and should
not be viewed as one of agency. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
65. Any analogy between partnerships and agencies will be imperfect because each partner
is both principal and agent. This undermines the application of traditional agency principles based
upon relationships hierarchical in character.
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consequences of a premature dissolution is that remaining partners have the
right, under specified conditions, to possess partnership property for the agreed
term."' In this sense, a partner opposing dissolution is in the same position as
the agent holding an irrevocable power."7 The positions of the agent and the
partner differ markedly, however, on the issue of continuing capacity to bind
the "principal."
The power to bind terminates with the dissolution of the
partnership,"" while the agent's authority continues notwithstanding the desire
of the "principal" to effect a termination.'"'
Apart from the continuation rights accorded non-breaching partners, the free
dissolvability posture of the UPA assumes that partnerships are the equivalent
of revocable agencies. 7"' This assumption, however, is based upon faulty prem-

To some extent, the "entity ver:us aggregate" issue is relevant to this problem. For a number
of years, scholars debated the issue of whether partnerships should be treated as entities or aggregates
of individual partners. A good review of this debate concerning legal personality may be found in
Jensen, Is a Partnership Under the Uniorm Act an Aggregate or an Entity?, 16 VAND. L. REv. 377 (1963).
For additional discussions, see Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act- A Criticism, 28 HARV. L. REv
762 (1915); Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act - A Reply to Mr. Crane's Criticism, 29 HARV. L
REv. 158 & 291 (1916); Lewis, The Uniform Partnership Act, 24 YALE L.J. 617, 638-41 (1915). The
UPA does not explicitly adopt either theory but instead reflects both in its various provisions. For
example, in one section the UPA suggests an aggregate approach by defining a partnership as "an
association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 6(1). See, e.g., Scott v. United States, 354 F.2d 292 (Ct. Cl. 1965). In another
section, the UPA establishes a relationship apparently unknown at common law by making partners
agents of their partnerships. UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9. But cf. NEB. REv. STAT. § 67-304 (1981)
(providing the Act "shall be interpreted and construed in harmony with the entity theory of
partnership; Provided, in all matters of interpretation and construction of [the Act] which do not
involve the entity theory of partnership, [the Act] shall be so interpreted and construed as to make
uniform the law of those states which have enacted or hereafter may enact it.") (emphasis in
original).
If the partnership is viewed for this purpose as a legal entity, the application of traditional
agency principles to the issue of revocability of the partnership would be somewhat clearer. The
partnership would represent the principal, while the partners would constitute the agents. This result
is consistent with the language of section 9 of the UPA. However, the principal focus of section
9 is directed to transactions between the partnership, through its members, and third parties. The
UPA does not dictate application of the entity approach to all matters affecting the relations of
partners inter se. Indeed, the ability of a single partner to compel a dissolution of the relationship
suggests an aggregate rather than entity approach to partnerships. This gives rise to the concept
of the partner as both principal and agent that complicates the analogy to other agencies.
66. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; infra notes 128-30.
67. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 75, at 427 ("As to the partnership property it might
be considered that there is a power coupled with an interest, given to secure the performance of
the contract.").
68. A dissolution, however, does not terminate a partnership, and liabilities may be incurred
during the winding up of partnership affairs. See UNIv. PARTNERSHiP ACT 5 30. If the business is
continued following a wrongful dissolution, practical problems may arise in indemnifying the dissolving partner against partnership liabilities. See Hillman, supra note 10, at 578-81.
69. Limited application of irrevocable agency principles to partnerships did not bother one
commentator. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 75, at 427.
70. However, partners, unlike agents, are permitted to possess partnership property for the
agreed term following a dissolution in contravention of their partnership agreement. See UNIF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(2)(b).
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7
ises. The nature of the typical partner's interest ' differs from that of the ordinary agent operating under a revocable power. Generally, an agent has no
interest other than an expectation of compensation for services rendered on
behalf of the principal. 72 The agent as principal is a contradiction in terms
under agency law.73 Partners, on the other hand, are co-principals and coowners who have substantial interests in their business ventures.
The risk of a partner is ordinarily greater than that of an agent. Partners
are jointly and severally liable for most of the obligations arising from their
ventures. 74 At least in cases in which the principal is disclosed, an agent who
contracts on behalf of a principal is not a party to the contract and suffers no
liability for a breach. 7 The agent's liability in tort is also limited, for although
an agent is responsible for his or her own tortious conduct, the liability does
7
not extend to such conduct by other agents of the principal. 6 Consequently,
the same agency principles that provide a basis for evaluating partners' liabilities
to third parties need not necessarily control issues affecting the relations of
77
partners to each other.
The position of a partner also differs from that of an agent operating under
an irrevocable power. Fiduciary principles restrict the extent to which one partner may pursue interests without regard to the effect of this action on other
partners.78 Typically, agents operate under similar, or perhaps even more strin-

71. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT S 24 ("The property rights of a partner are (1) his rights
in specific partnership property, (2) his interest in the partnership, and (3) his right to participate
in the management."); id. S 25 (defining the nature of a partner's right in specific partnership
property); id. 5 26 ("A partner's interest in the partnership is his share of the profits and surplus,
and the same is personal property.").
72. Invariably, courts find that a mere expectation of compensation is not a sufficient interest
to render an agency irrevocable. See, e.g., Taylor v. Bums, 203 U.S. 120 (1906); Kirchof v.
Friedman, 10 Ariz. App. 220, 457 P.2d 760 (1969); Peacock v. American Agronomics Corp., 422
So. 2d 55 (Fla. 2d D.C.A. 1982); Maddox v. District Supply Inc., 222 Md. 31, 158 A.2d 650
(1960); Chain v. Pye, 429 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968).
73. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
74. See supra note 50.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY 5 320 (1957). See generaly H. REUSCHLEIN &
supra note 3, 55 118-23.
76. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, 5 343 (1957) ("an agent who does an act
otherwise a tort is not relieved from liability by the fact that he acted at the command of the
principal or on account of the principal"); id. 5 350 ("An agent is subject to liability if, by his
75.

W.

GREGORY,

acts, he creates an unreasonable risk of harm to the interests of others protected against negligent
invasion."). See generally H. REUSCHLEIN & W. GREGORY, supra note 3, 55 124-32.
77. But see Lapenta v. Lettieri, 72 Conn. 377, 378, 44 A. 730, 732 (1890) (pre-UPA case:
"Each partner is the general agent of the firm, and the firm is the agent of each partner, with
power to bind him to a personal liability in favor of partnership creditors. Whoever acts as another's

agent must base his authority on the other's assent. Such assent, if given, may be retracted at
any time, as regards future transactions. This doctrine in the law of agency rests on reasons which
fully apply to the partnership relation."); A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, 5 75, at 427 ("As to the
power to continue to create personal obligations of the withdrawing partner, there seems to be no

reason, under agency principles, why it should not be capable of revocation, though in breach of
contract.").
78. See infra note 212.
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gent, fiduciary standards." However, when an agency is coupled with an interest, the agent is in a position superior to that of the partner; the very purpose
of a power rendering an agency irrevocable is to permit the agent to act for
his or her own interests rather than those of the principal. " ' Thus, an agent
holding an irrevocable power is not really an agent at all."
Classifying partnerships as either normal agency relationships or irrevocable
agencies is both simplistic and misleading." A more sensible approach acknowledges that partnerships fall somewhere between these two extremes and
evaluates the issue by determining which type of agency the partnership most
closely approximates. Viewed in this light, the interests of a partner in a fixed
term partnership bear a stronger resemblance to those of an agent with irrevocable powers than those of a more typical agent. Support for this conclusion
may be drawn from the Reporter's Comment to section 138 of the Restatement
(Second) of Agency. After observing that an agent's interest in compensation is
an ordinary incident of agency, the Comment adds: "On the other hand, an
agent has an interest in the subject matter, as where he engages in a joint
enterprise in which another supplies the subject matter, a power given him by
the other to protect such interest is a power given as security.""' Professor
Seavey later elaborated on this principle:
First, the distinction between agency powers and proprietary powers.
The theory is simple but there are many cases close to the line. In a
few cases, the courts have made obvious errors, having permitted the
fact that the agent expended money in reliance upon the continuance of
his powers, to blind them to the fact that there was a fiduciary relationship with a primary obligation to subserve the interests of the principal. But of course it is possible that even an agency agreement shall be intended
by the parties to give to the agent an indefeasible interest in the property itself,
making him a co-owner, so that thereafter he is working for his own interest and
for that of the principal...
If the agency relationship is found, of course, it is terminable at will,
although there was an agreement that it should not be terminated, or
although the agent advanced money, or although it was expressed not
to be revocable ...
Where there is a proprietary power, i.e., where the power was given
as security, or on a contract not of agency, for the benefit of the power
holder or of a third person, it is not revocable by the will of the power
giver . ... '

79. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 13, comment a (1957); id. § 387, comment
a. Both agents and partners are subject to fiduciary standards.
80. See, eg., id. 5 14H, comment a; id. § 387, comment a.
81.
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 65.
83. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, § 138, comment b (1957).
84. W. SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 123 (1949) (emphasis added). Consider in this regard
the comments of Professor Mechem, who included in his description of cases of irrevocability the
following:
1. There are cases in which the agent has acquired some interest of his own in the execution
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Professor Seavey, of course, was not comparing partners with agents holding
irrevocable powers; nevertheless, his emphasis on proprietary powers is both
useful and relevant to partnerships. Even though a partner's interest may fall
somewhat short of that of the agent holding an irrevocable power, it exceeds
that of the typical agent whose interest is limited to compensation. The closer
resemblance of partnerships to irrevocable agencies calls into question the use
of agency principles as a basis for free dissolvability of fixed term partnerships.
The conclusion that all partners must have the power to dissolve their ventures, accordingly, is not an inevitable consequence of the law of agency. The
policy of the UPA permitting free dissolvability of fixed term partnerships represents a questionable concession to rigid, and arguably antiquated, principles
governing termination of the authority of an agent.as The drafters of the UPA
could have recognized the special character of partnerships and declined to apply
agency principles, at least with respect to the dissolvability of partnerships.
Alternatively, the drafters could have borrowed from principles of agency and
concluded that a partnership may bear a sufficient similarity to an agency
coupled with an interest to render it irrevocable in the face of an agreement
establishing a term. 6 In reflecting neither of these alternatives, the UPA overemphasizes risk-aversion interests at the expense of other considerations important to individuals conducting a business as partners.
II.

BEYOND

THE

UPA:

OF FAIRNESS,

EFFICIENCY AND

MORALITY

Consistent with the clear treatment of the issue in the UPA, a number of
cases have held that a court can neither enjoin dissolution of a partnership nor
direct specific performance of a partnership agreement . 7 The "wrongful" character of a dissolution in contravention of a partnership agreement controls the
consequences of the act of dissolution, not the act's effectiveness as a means
of dramatically altering the legal relationships between the partners."' The decision to breach a partnership agreement and prematurely dissolve the venture,
in short, lies within the discretion of the partner contemplating dissolution.
One argument supporting free dissolvability of partnerships focuses on the

of the authority, in addition to his mere interest in the contract of employment with its
resulting gains.... 2. There may be cases in which the agent has been induced to assume
a responsibility, or incur a liability, in reliance upon the continuance of the authority,

under such circumstances that, if the authority be withdrawn, the agent will be exposed
to personal loss or injury .....
F. MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 569, at 406 (2d ed. 1914).
85. Evaluating the standards of revocability for existing agencies is beyond the scope of this
article. The question arises, however, whether the revocability issue under agency law should be
treated primarily as a problem of remedies.
86. The rather restrictive approach of agency law to the question of revocability has been
relaxed in some jurisdictions when the agency is in the form of a shareholder proxy. See, e.g.,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 705 (West Supp. 1985) (providing that some proxies are irrevocable when
issued in connection with agreements among shareholders in close corporations). See generally H.
HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 520-22 (1983).

87. See supra note 11.
88. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
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numerous problems underlying the remedy of specific performance of partnership agreements. The existing approach of the UPA is supportable to the degree
that monetary damages are sufficient to provide adequate compensation to partners faced with a premature dissolution, and to the degree that specific performance is a remedy the law should discourage. Viewed in this light, the
problem may be no different than that of designing an appropriate remedy for
the breach of any type of contract.
This broader problem of contract law has been the subject of extended
scholarly commentary and debate. At issue is the correctness of the rather clear
preference of courts to favor damages over equitable relief as a remedy for
breach of contract. Regardless of any shortcomings of prevailing judicial approaches, changes in long-established attitudes disfavoring equitable relief have
been slow. As one commentator has observed, "the very notion of contracts
is tied to remedies, and the law of contracts, unlike tort, has traditionally been
sparing, if not niggardly, with them." 9
A recent decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals demonstrates both
dissatisfaction with an absolute rule of free dissolvability and an inclination to
view the partnership law question as merely one aspect of the larger remedies
issue. In Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc.,'"' two corporations, Infusaid
and Intermedics," established a joint venture to develop and sell drug infusion
devices.' 2 The agreement was for a fixed term"' and assigned management
responsibility to Infusaid. The agreement further provided that if, at any time,
Infusaid was in material default under the agreement, Intermedics could assume

89. Linzer, On the Amorality o] Contract Remedies - Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement,
81 COLUM. L. REv. 111, 111 (1981).
90. 739 F.2d 661 (1stCir. 1984).
91.
Shortened names are adopted for clarity. Participants in the litigation included Metal
Bellows Corporation and its subsidiary Infusaid Corporation, on one side, and Intermedics, Inc.
and its subsidiary, Intermedics Infiusaid, Inc., on the other. Naming the joint venture Infusaid
Company further confused corporate identities.
92. For most purposes, including wrongful dissolutions, joint ventures are treated as the
equivalent of partnerships. See A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 35, at 192; D. FESSLER, supra note
50, at 191-97. The court expressed some reservations over such a conclusion, particularly when
the joint venturers are corporations. 739 F.2d at 662-63; see also Eastern Electrical v. Taylor
Woodrow Blitman Constr. Corp., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 192, 198, 414 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (1981)
("We are of the opinion that the [IJPA] . . . should not be interpreted as having direct statutory
and mandatory application to at least joint ventures which include corporate participants .... Accordingly, we treat the [UPAJ as having relevance to joint ventures with corporate participants
only by way of analogy and only when the use of the analogy in particular circumstances will
achieve a just result."). Nevertheless, the court chose to apply the UPA because it perceived that
result to be consistent with the intention of the parties at the inception of their venture. 739 F.2d
at 663.
93. The First Circuit did not indicate the term of the venture, although the opinion is
obviously based upon the assumption that the venture was for a fixed term rather than terminable
at will. In the brief of the appellees, a reference is made to dissolution provisions in the joint
venture agreement providing that the venture would continue until the year 2030, unless one party
acquired the entire venture or the parties agreed to an earlier termination. Brief for Appellees, at
35-36, Infusaid Corp., 739 F.2d at 661.
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control of the venture until the default was removed or cured. 94 The parties
had a "falling out," and Infusaid "ousted" Intermedics from the venture. "
Infusaid, seeking to make permanent the ouster, then sought a judicial decree
of dissolution under section 32 of the UPA.
The district court denied Infusaid's request for a decree of dissolution9 6 and
found Infusaid's ouster of Intermedics to be an incurable material default under
the joint venture agreement.97 The court ordered that the venture be managed
by Intermedics pursuant to the agreement's provisions providing for a transfer
of control upon Infusaid's material default9 s and broadly enjoined actions by
Infusaid that would undermine effective management by Intermedics." This
order was especially injurious to Infusaid, for the finding that the material
default by Infusaid was incurable rendered it impossible for Infusaid to take
corrective action to regain management control over the venture. In effect, if
not in words, the district court's order was equivalent to an order for specific

94. The agreement provided that management was in the hands of a committee of five
directors. Under normal conditions, Infusaid was to appoint three of the directors, while Intermedics'
could designate two. The agreement further provided, however, that if Infusaid was in material
default, Intermedics could designate a majority of the members of the management committee until
the default was cured. 739 F.2d at 664.
95. Infusaid claimed Intermedics had breached its fiduciary obligations and the joint venture
agreement by misappropriating intellectual property of Infusaid and developing a competitive product
outside of the venture. Infusaid also claimed that Intermedics breached its fiduciary obligations to
the venture by failing to provide additional financing. The lower court, however, found that Intermedics met its obligations under the agreement and had neither misappropriated an asset of
Infusaid nor engaged in competition with the venture. Id. at 664-65.
96. Id. at 665.
97. The material default consisted of the ouster of Intermedics by Infusaid. Id.
98. Id.
99. The permanent injunction provided:
1. The management Committee of the joint venture, made up of three members appointed
by the defendants and two members appointed by the plaintiffs, shall conduct the business
of the joint venture, with full disclosure to the defendants of all information they request
.concerning the joint venture.
2. The plaintiffs ... shall not interfere with the defendant's full and free access to all
business and technical information concerning the joint venture.
3. The plaintiffs ... shall make available to the defendants all technical information concerning the joint venture.
4. The plaintiffs . . . shall not permit the alteration, removal or destruction of any data,
records, equipment or other assets relating to the work of the joint venture.
5. The plaintiffs ... shall not take any action that would adversely affect the value of
the defendants' option to purchase the joint venture.
6. The plaintiffs ... shall not take any action that would interfere with the continued
loyalty and employment of any employee or independent contractor of the joint venture ....
7. None of the plaintiffs or defendants shall sell, convey, transfer or assign . . . any interest
in the joint venture to any third party ....
8. The plaintiffs shall not sell, convey, transfer or assign to any third party . . . any right
to produce, sell or distribute any product of the joint venture without the express prior
written consent of the three members of the Management Committee of the joint venture.
Order and Judgment of the District Court, at 6.
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performance,' € permanently altered the nature of the venture, and precluded
Infusaid from responding to the alteration by declaring the venture dissolved.
The lower court's order was tantamount to a permanent injunction against a
dissolution. ""
On appeal, Infusaid unsuccessfully argued that the refusal of the lower court
to grant dissolution under section 32 of the UPA was reversible error. As an
alternative ground for reversal, Infusaid argued that its exclusion of Intermedics2
was, in essence, a dissolution of the venture through an expression of will."
The First Circuit agreed that the partnership had been dissolved and added
that there is a "strong presumption against specific performance of a joint
venture or partnership agreement.""" The court went on to suggest in dicta,
however, that in some cases specific performance of a partnership or joint
venture agreement may be an appropriate remedy:
Where all parties to the agreement are corporations and there has
been a dissolution per se of the relationship, however, and legal remedies
have explicitly been found inadequate, a court may order specific performance of the agreement if the relationship is found to be without a
significant personal service component. That is, if the joint venture or
partnership can be maintained as an ongoing, profit-making concern
without obliging any officer or director of the corporation that per se
dissolved the relationship to continue in such a partnership against his
will, . . . then specific performance may be rendered, again assuming
the inadequacy of a legal remedy. By specific performance in this context
we mean that the district court may order the corporate co-venturers to
continue the business together according to the terms of the joint venture agreement. 104
The court of appeals then remanded with an instruction that if the lower court
could not make findings necessary to sustain its remedy of specific performance,
then that portion of its order should be reversed.""
The qualification of the principle of free dissolvability suggested by the First
Circuit is inconsistent with section 31 of the UPA,"n' which expressly contem-

100. The court of appeals treated the lower court's remedy as one of specific performance.
739 F.2d at 669 n.3.
101.
"At this point, then, we must question the propriety of the district court's permanent
injunction . . . against a dissolution per se that had already taken place." Id. at 668. While this
interpretation is consistent with the breadth of the injunction granted by the district court, the
lower court did not specifically reference in its order an injunction against a dissolution.
102. Id. at 667.
103. Id. at 669.
104. Id. (emphasis in original).
105. The subsequent history of this case reveals a treatment of the issue more in line with
the free dissolvability position of the UPA. On remand, the district court awarded control of the
venture's assets to Intermedics. It also required Intermedics to post a bond securing the payment
of Infusaid's interest, discounted to reflect its loss of goodwill. This is consistent with the UPA's
treatment of wrongful dissolutions. See UNIP. PARTNERSHIP AcT 5 38(2). The First Circuit affirmed.
Infusaid Corp. v. Intermedics Infusaid, Inc., 756 F.2d I (1st Cir. 1985).
106. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 31 provides:
Dissolution is caused:
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plates dissolution in contravention of a partnership agreement. As a matter of
statutory interpretation, therefore, this aspect of the opinion is unsound. Even
the First Circuit recognized, correctly, the "wealth of precedent" to the contrary
and the lack of authorities supporting the exception it developed.' 7 Regrettably,
the court provided little analysis in support of its position. Indeed, its defense
of the exception seems to rest largely on the assumption that it is of limited
applicability.
Because of the lack of analysis supporting the dicta on specific performance,
the Infusaid opinion could be dismissed as aberrational."a The decision bears
closer examination, however, because it evidences a desire to circumvent the
seemingly absolute rule of the UPA. By" implicitly treating the issue as a matter
of remedies, the First Circuit laid the foundation for a court with a more
expansive approach towards equitable remedies to undermine significantly the
principle of free dissolvability of partnerships.
The importance of the Infusaid opinion becomes clear with an examination
of the circumstances under which specific performance might be available. Under the court's analysis, the enforcement of an agreement concerning a partnership term is dependent upon three principal conditions: first, the partners
or joint venturers must be incorporated; second, existing legal remedies must
be inadequate; and third, the venture must be without a significant personal

(1) Without violation of the agreement between the partners,

(a) By the termination of the definite term or particular undertaking specified in the
agreement;
(b) By the express will of any partner when no definite term or particular undertaking
is specified;
(c) By the express will of all the partners who have not assigned their interests or
suffered them to be charged for their separate debts, either before or after the termination
of any specified term or particular undertaking;
(d) By the expulsion of any partner from the business bona fide in accordance with
such a power conferred by the agreement between the partners;
(2) In contravention of the agreement between the partners, where the circumstances
do not permit a dissolution under any other provision of this section, by the express will
of any partner at any time;
(3) By any event which makes it unlawful for the business of the partnership to be
carried on or for the members to carry it on in partnership;
(4) By the death of any partner;
(5) By the bankruptcy of any partner or the partnership;
(6) By decree of court under section 32.
107. 739 F.2d at 668.
108. The court presumably assumed its general equitable powers may be utilized to overcome
the effects of the UPA's free dissolvability rule. There is some support for this approach in a preUPA decision: "There may be cases in which equity would enjoin a dissolution for a time, when
the circumstances were such as to make it specially injurious." Solomon v. Kirkwood, 55 Mich.
256, 259-60, 21 N.W. 336, 337-38 (1884). The Solomon court, however, chose not to exercise such
powers, noting that "[tihere can be no such thing as an indissoluble partnership." In light of the
development of the UPA's position of free dissolvability, the use of equitable powers to accomplish
a contrary result is questionable. Cf. McCollum v. McCollum, 67 S.W.2d 1055, 1056-57 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1934) (pre-UPA decision noting "there can be no such thing as an indissoluble partnership," and adding that a partner "would, under no circumstances, be permitted to compel the
maintaining of a partnership by mandatory injunction.").
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services element. Although Infusaid assumed that these conditions represent a
"strong presumption against" specific performance, other courts might question
the strength of that presumption.
A.

The Relevance of Corporate Status

Traditionally, corporations were without power to enter into partnerships.
The reason for this rule was that the authority of partners to bind each other
was incompatible with the requirement that management of a corporation was
vested exclusively in its board of directors. One technical but effective method
around the restriction on corporate powers was to structure the jointly owned
business as a joint venture rather than a partnership."'
Today, most jurisdictions permit corporations to enter into partnerships.""
This issue, strangely, is still alive in Massachusetts,"' the laws of which, the
Infusaid court apparently assumed, controlled the dispute."' The relationship
between power of corporations to enter partnerships and the issue of free dissolvability, however, is not apparent. Indeed, if there is any question concerning
a corporation's power to participate in a partnership, a court should be less

109. See supra note 92.
110. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 2 (providing " 'Person' includes individuals, partnerships,
corporations, and other associations"); id. § 6 (defining a partnership as "an association of two
or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit"). The issue is frequently addressed
in corporation codes, the more modern of which authorize corporate participation in partnerships.
See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE 5 207(h) (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 122 (1975);
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT 5 3.02(9) (1984). See generally A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, 5 9 D.
FESSLER, supra note 50, at 191-92. Professor Fessler has observed, "in many jurisdictions the public
policy prohibition on corporate partners is in full force." Id. at 192.
111. In adopting the UPA, Massachusetts accepted the Act's definition of a partnership as
"an association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit." See UNiF.
PARTNERSHIP ACT 5 6(1); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 108A, § 6 (West 1958). However, Massachusetts law departs from the UPA in not defining "person" to include "individuals, partnerships,

corporations, and other associations." See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT 5 2; MASS. GEN. LAws ANN.
ch. 108A, 5 2 (West 1958). Nevertheless, Massachusetts legislation of general applicability provides
that the term "person" shall, "unless a contrary intention clearly appears . . . include corporations,
societies, associations, and partnerships." Id. ch. 4, § 7 (West 1976). Further, the Massachusetts
Business Corporation Law provides, "to the extent authorized by its articles of organization, a
corporation may be a partner in any business enterprise which said corporation would have power
to conduct by itself." Id. ch. 1568, § 9A (West 1970); see also MASS. ADMIN. ConE tit. 950, 5
104.04 (1979). Therefore, the statement in Infusaid that the power of corporations to enter partnerships is an "uncertain" issue is peculiar. See also Eastern Electrical Co. v. Taylor Woodrow
Blitman Contr. Corp., 11 Mass. App. Ct. 192, 198, 414 N.E.2d 1023, 1026-27 (1981). Recent
cases involving incorporated partners have not even addressed this question. See, e.g., JRY Corp.
v. LeRoux, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 153, 464 N.E.2d 82 (1984); Lazzaro v. Holladay, 15 Mass. App.
Ct. 108, 443 N.E.2d 1347 (1983).
112. The court did not explain its reason for looking to Massachusetts law on this issue. The
partners were incorporated under the laws of Delaware and Texas. Other Massachusetts cases have
held that the validity of a corporate act is determined by the governing documents of the corporation
and the law of the state of incorporation. See, e.g., Wasserman v. National Gypsum Co., 335 Mass.
240, 139 N.E.2d 410 (1957); Edwards v. Fields, 57 Mass. App. Dec. 22 (1975), aff'd 371 Mass.
895, 351 N.E.2d 768 (1976).
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inclined to enjoin dissolution of a partnership or joint venture comprised only
of incorporated participants than one comprised exclusively of natural persons.
The incorporated status of partners is better treated as relevant to the personal service limitation on specific performance." ' 3 To the degree that the personal services component is not present, it makes little difference whether or
not the partners are incorporated. As an independent limitation on equitable
relief, therefore, the incorporated partner restriction articulated in Infusaid is of
little importance.
B.

The Adequacy of Legal Remedies Debate

Infusaid expressly conditioned the availability of specific performance of a
partnership agreement upon proof that existing legal remedies are inadequate.
This represents a traditional approach to specific performance reflected in so
many cases involving breaches of contracts. In the more particular context of
partnerships, the issue becomes: To what extent are the existing remedies of
partnership law adequate to protect the interests of the non-breaching partner?
A partnership agreement, let us assume, is a contract.' '1 The remedies provided by law upon breach define the true meaning of a contract. Although the
point is somewhat controversial, most commentators seem to agree that the
principal objective of contract remedies is to protect the expectations of the
non-breaching party." ' , This normally means placing that party in as good a
position as he or she would have enjoyed if the contract had been performed."

113. See infra notes 149-56 and accompanying text; cf. Schwartz, 7he Casefor Specific Performance,
89 YALE LJ. 271, 297 (1979) ("requiring a sizable corporation that renders services to perform
for a given promisee does not violate the corporation's associational interests or the associational

interests of its employees").
There is some indication in the Infusaid opinion that the incorporated status of the venturers
is also relevant to the personal services limitation on specific performance. See 739 F.2d at 669.
114. See infra notes 192-200 and accompanying text.
115. See, e.g., Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1107, 1127
(1984); Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1147 (1970);
Schwartz, supra note 113, at 271.
116. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides:
Judicial remedies under the rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect one or more
of the following interests of a promisee:
(a) his 'expectation interest,' which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain
by being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been
performed,
(b) his 'reliance interest,' which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by
reliance on the contract by being put in as good a position as he would have been in
had the contract not been made, or
(c) his 'restitution interest,' which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit
that he has conferred on the other party.
RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONT.ACrS
344 (1981). The Comment to this section indicates that
ordinarily a court will protect the promisee's expectation interests. See id. S 344, comment a; see
also id. § 347 (providing that normally an injured party has the right to damages based on expectation interests as measured by the loss in value to him of the other party's nonperformance);
id. 5 349 (providing for damages based on reliance interests as an alternative for the injured party
when profits are uncertain); id. S 371 (outlining the measure of restitution interests).
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Some commentators, and probably even more contracting parties, believe
contracts represent moral commitments and are enforceable without regard to
resulting inefficiences. Others argue that a party to a contract does not have
an absolute right to the enforcement of its terms. Those inclined towards this
view often look to the words of Justice Holmes for support:
Nowhere is the confusion between legal and moral ideas more manifest than in the law of contract. . . . The duty to keep a contract at
common law means a prediction that you must pay damages if you do
not keep it, - and nothing else . . . . If you commit a tort, you are
liable to pay a compensatory sum. If you commit a contract, you are
liable to pay a compensatory sum unless the promised event comes to
pass, and that is all the difference. But such a mode of looking at the
matter stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get
as much ethics into the law as they can." 7
The Holmes analysis largely reflects the premises underlying existing remedies
for a breach of contract."" A contemporary extension of this approach is found
in the so-called theory of efficient breach.'"' Under this theory, providing the
promisee with compensatory damages 2 " and permitting the promisor to seek

117. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 462 (1897).
118. "Our system, then, is not directed at compulsion of promisors to prevent breach; rather, it
is aimed at relief to promisees to redress breach ....
[TIhis at least adds to the celebrated freedom
to make contracts, a considerable freedom to break them as well." Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for
Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1147 (1970) (emphasis in original); see also Fuller &
Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (pt. 1), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 79 (1936) (courts never
"knowingly put the plaintiff in a better position than he would have occupied had the contract
been fully performed").
119. One of the early, and perhaps first, uses of the term is found in Goetz & Scott, Liquidated
Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle. Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and a Theory
of Efficient Breach, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 554 (1977). Professor Macneil observed the concept was first
suggested in Birmingham, Breach of Contract, Damages Measures, and Economic Efficiency, 24 RUJTGERS
L. REV. 273 (1970). See Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REV. 947,
947 n.2 (1982).
The modern law of contract damages is based on the premise that a contractual obligation is not necessarily an obligation to perform, but rather an obligation to choose
between performance and compensatory damages. Once a contemplated exchange has been
negotiated, the breaching party is merely required to provide 'just compensation' equal to
the value of the performance. . .. As long as the compensation adequately mirrors the
value of performance, this damage rule is 'efficient.' It induces a result superior to performance, since one party receives the same benefits as performance while the other is
able to do even better.
For an argument that specific performance advances efficiency objectives and should be as routinely
available as the damages remedy, see Schwartz, supra note 113, at 271. For an argument that
efficiency considerations mitigate against expanded availability of specific performance, see Kronman,
Specific Performance, 45 U. CH. L. REV. 351 (1978). See infra note 139.
120. Posner offers the following justification for breach:
JA] breach [is] in a sense involuntary. It was committed only to avert a larger loss. The
breaching party would have been happier had there been no occasion to commit a breach.
But in some cases a party would be tempted to breach the contract simply because his
profit from breach would exceed his expected profit from completion of the contract, and
if damages are limited to loss of expected profit, there will be an incentive to commit a
breach. There should be.
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other avenues of wealth maximation result in societal benefits through efficient
2
allocation of limited resources.1 '

Some of these contemporary views can be seen in the UPA,'2 2 which establishes the power of a partner to dissolve a partnership prematurely if that
partner is prepared to accept the economic consequences of such an action.
Certain aspects of the wrongful dissolution provisions of the UPA, however,
may result in the overcompensation of the non-breaching partner. Assuming
that "promisors who breach increase society's welfare if their benefit exceeds
the losses of their promisees, i23 the secondary sanctions applied against the
wrongfully dissolving partner - loss of the economic value of partnership goodwill and loss of the right to possess partnership property for the agreed term12 4
- may cause that partner to continue to participate in a venture even when
damages would adequately compensate the non-breaching partner.
If efficient utilization of resources is a goal to be advanced, and if the
breaching partner can utilize the resources of the partnership more productively
than the non-breaching partner, the breaching partner arguably should be
awarded the assets of the partnership following dissolution. In addition, the
breaching partner should only be required to give the non-breaching partner
the value of his or her interest and any damages for proven lost profits. By
promoting the liquidity interests of breaching partners, efficiency gains may
result from the more productive use of assets controlled-by partnerships. Viewed
in this light, the secondary sanctions of the UPA appear punitive and inefficient
125
rather than compensatory in character.
Conversely, the approach of the UPA to wrongful dissolution may undercompensate some non-breaching partners. Adequate compensation presupposes
placing the non-breaching partner in an economic position equivalent to that
resulting had the premature dissolution not occurred. In simple contract cases
involving fungible goods, this objective of economic equivalency is achievable.
Partners, however, are not fungible goods. They resemble neither potatoes nor
widgets. Admittedly, damages resulting from a premature dissolution are sometimes readily proven and, when combined with the secondary sanctions, adequate to protect the interests of the non-dissolving partner. Adequate
compensation for non-breaching partners, however, may be a difficult goal to
"

R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAw 89-90 (2d ed. 1977); seealso Farnsworth, Damages and
Specific Relief, 27 AM. J. COMP. L. 247, 247-48 (1979) ("For the good of society, its resources
should be efficiently allocated at every point in time .... Even if a party is bound by a contract
to allocate his resources in a particular way, the good of society requires that he break the contract
and reallocate his resources whenever this makes him better off without making someone else worse
off.").
121. This article will not attempt a general efficiency analysis of partnership dissolutions. See
infra note 139.
122. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP AcT S 38(2).
123. Linzer, supra note 89, at 114 (highlighting some of the deficiencies of the efficiency theory).
124. See UN,,. PARTNERSHIP AcT S 38(2)(b)-(c).
125. This, of course, does not preclude bargaining concerning dissolution of the partnership.
Recognition that such negotiations do and should take place is an important part of the efficient
breach theory.
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achieve. Decisions discussing the scope of damages arising from a premature
dissolution are sparse. Although courts generally agree that damages are recoverable for profits lost as a result of a wrongful dissolution, the degree to
which the principle is applied is open to question.'2" Interestingly the problem
of accurately assessing damages prompts many courts to grant specific performance of contracts other than partnership agreements involving unique, as
opposed to fungible, goods."5 7

126. In spite of extensive litigation on the subject of partnership dissolutions, there are relatively
few cases dealing with damages for premature dissolutions. This may be attributable to the high
cost of litigating damages and the difficulty of proof in these types of eases. One of the more
complete discussions of damages arising from a wrongful dissolution is found in Gherman v. Colburn, 72 Cal. App. 3d 544, 561-65, 140 Cal. Rptr. 330, 341-43 (1977). In Gheman, the court
quoted with approval language in a pre-UPA decision of the United States Supreme Court suggesting
damages may include profits prevented by a wrongful dissolution. Id. at 561-62, 140 Cal. Rptr.
at 341. Proof of such damages, however, may be problematic. See, e.g., Friedman v. Golden Arrow
Films, Inc., 442 F.2d 1099 (2d Cir. 1971) (in an action for breach of the financing provisions of
a joint venture agreement, the appellate court found a lower court's award of damages for loss of
expected profits "not presently sustainable"); Williams v. Hildebrand, 220 Ark. 202, 205, 247
S.W.2d 356, 358 (1952) ("The evidence must afford a sufficient basis for estimating the anticipated
profits with reasonable certainty ... Also, there must be deducted whatever amounts the [nonbreaching partner] may fairly be expected to earn in other suitable emptoyment, the [dissolving
partner] having the burden of proof on this issue."); A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 75, at 428
n.78 ("The measure of damages is complicated .... If the other partners exercise their right to
continue the business, they apparently give up any claim for destruction of the business, although
they may still be able to recover for injury to it ... If they exercise their further right to keep
all the partnership property, by securing to the dissolving partner the amount due him, they can
hardly claim injury resulting from the withdrawal of partnership assets or funds, and thus they
further reduce the damages they may recover."). Compare James v. Herbert, 149 Cal. App. 2d
741, 749, 309 P.2d 91, 96 (1957) ("Where without fault on his part, one party to a contract who
is willing to perform is prevented fiom doing so by the other party, the primary measure of his
damages is the amount of his loss, which may consist of his reasonable outlay or expenditure
Damages
toward performance and the anticipated profits which he would have derived from performance...
consisting of the loss of anticipated profits need not be established with certainty.") (emphasis added) with
D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.3, at 153-57 (1973) (discussing the traditional
problems of recovery for lost profits and observing, "[tlhe certainty rule is very often applied to
bar claims for lost profits. Perhaps it is applied to bar such claims more often than in any other
case."). Several cases have indicated lost profits are recoverable but have provided little or no
guidance concerning damage computation. See, e.g., Karrick v. Hannaman, 168 U.S. 328, 337
(1897) (pre-UPA); Pemberton v. Ladue Realty & Constr. Co., 237 Mo. App. 971, 982, 180 S.W.2d
766, 771 (1944) (pre-UPA); Farwell v. Wilcox, 73 Okla. 230, 231-32, 175 P. 936, 937 (1918) (preUPA).
As to the effect of disregarding goodwill in account valuation, in many cases the value of
goodwill is minimal or rests in the skills or reputation of the dissolving partner. For a discussion
of the use of dissolution as a means of "misappropriating" the goodwill of a business, see Hillman,
supra note 17, at 27-33. For a brief discussion of the use of liquidated damages clauses in partnership
agreements, see infra note 171.
127. See generally A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 1136-1142 (1964) (discussing the adequacy of specific performance as a remedy for a variety of contractual problems); Kronman, supra
note 119, at 351. Professor Kronman observes:
Whenever a court calculates money damages, there is some risk that it will undercompensate the injured party. But the magnitude of the risk is inversely related to the completeness and reliability of the information on which the court bases its award. At one
extreme, where there is a well-developed market generating evidence of substitutability,
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The UPA provides a limited version of specific performance by granting a
non-breaching partner the right to possess partnership property for the agreed
term and defer the dissolving partner's account settlement.'28 These provisions
advance the risk-aversion interests of the dissolving partner but disregard this
same partner's liquidity interests. If the non-breaching partner is in a position
to carry on the business, the continuation right, when combined with adequate
damages and a deferred account settlement, also advances the non-breaching
partner's stability interests. Theoretically, the continuation right also gives the
non-breaching partner the economic equivalent of the benefit of the original
bargain. Given the difficulty of establishing prospective damages, however, this
ideal state is seldom achieved.
Continuation of the business is sometimes impractical, particularly when the
withdrawing partner's contributions are unique and therefore cannot be replaced. For example, if the dissolving partner has brought to the venture skills,
technical expertise, research capacities, or a reputation important to the success
of the partnership, '2 9 the possibility of continuing the business alone or with a
substitute partner may be remote.1 3" If damages are limited because they are
incapable of proof, the remedies of the UPA can hardly be viewed as compensatory. Risk-aversion interests are thus advanced, while liquidity and stability
considerations largely are subordinated.
As an alternative to continuation, the non-breaching partner faced with a
premature dissolution may elect to wind up the affairs of the business and
liquidate its assets.' 3 ' However, if no market exists for the assets the liquidation
this risk is minimal. At the other extreme, where there is no market or at most a few
isolated transactions, this risk is substantial. There is a point between these two extremes
at which the risk becomes unacceptably large .... This is the point separating those contracts that are specifically enforceable from those that are not - the point to which the
uniqueness test obliquely refers.
Id. at 363.
128. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT 5 38(2)(b)-(c). The continuation right is conditioned on (1)
unanimous agreement among non-breaching partners to continue the venture; (2) settlement of the
dissolving partner's account or securing the payment of this amount by bond; and (3) indemnification of the dissolving partner against certain partnership liabilities. Id. For a discussion of these
conditions and other problems in continuing a partnership following its dissolution, see Hillman,
supra note 10, at 552-58.
129. Cf. Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d 192, 359 P.2d 41, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643 (1961) (dissolving
partner more involved in management than the other partner). This will often be the case when
the non-breaching partner has provided the financing while the dissolving partner operated the
business.
130. Professor Latty observed:
[One partner may suffer "irreparable" loss, not readily compensable by the damages he
may recover from the other partner for breach of the contract to continue a partnership,
if the contract-breaking partner is allowed to pull out and take his talent and share of the
firm property away with him.
E. LATrY, INTRODUCTION TO BUSINEss AssocIATIONs 471 (1951).
Although the non-breaching partner may preclude the dissolving partner from pulling out his
share of the firm property, there is little the non-breaching partner can do to compel the dissolving
partner to leave his talent in the venture. For a discussion of convenants not to compete, see infra
notes 172-79 and accompanying text.
131. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT S 38(2)(a).
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option may prove unsatisfactory. ' 2 The distress sale character of many liquidations of closely held businesses is well documented."' Indeed, the UPA does
not preclude a partner who has wrongfully caused a premature dissolution from
acquiring the assets of the partnership and continuing the business without the
non-breaching partner.' 14 This gives rise to the so-called squeeze out, partnership
style. Such a tactic advances both the risk-aversion and liquidity interests of
the breaching partner. This may result in a more efficient use of resources by
freeing a portion of capital otherwise trapped in a business. However, the nonbreaching and now excluded partner may be left in a position inferior to that
resulting from full performance of the partnership agreement.
Wholly apart from the question of efficiency is the issue of, for want of a
better term, morality.'
Professor Linzer argues:
"[M]orality" stands for the idea that it is both fair and appropriate to
hold people to promises they freely made. This view is inspired both
by a desire to protect the promisee's reasonable expectations and by a
sense that personal liberty requires that people be able to bind themselves
in a manner that will be enforced by the courts. Notions of liberty of
contract have changed over the years, and courts will not enforce promises that are induced unfairly or that contain unfair terms. Assuming a
fair bargain, however defined, the law ought to hold parties to their
agreement.' "
In part, the "moral" approach to remedies is justified by perceived deficiencies in analyses of economic efficiency. Professor Linzer observes that much
of the scholarship in law and economics "has been devoted to measuring values
for which there is no conventional market."" 7 While an efficiency analysis may
provide satisfactory results in the commercial setting, in other contexts the
"economist can only speculate about what is important to the parties, and is
likely to ignore or denigrate those values that only the parties can accurately

132. This problem is discussed in Hillman, supra note 10, at 532-33.
133. See, e.g., A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 83A, at 474.
134. Utilizing dissolution as a method of "appropriating" the interest of a partner at an unfair
price may violate fiduciary standards applicable to partners. See, e g., Page v. Page, 55 Cal. 2d
192, 197-98, 359 P.2d 41, 45, 10 Cal. Rptr. 643, 647 (1961) (dictum warning that use of dissolution
as a method of appropriating the "new prosperity" of a partnership without adequate compensation
is a breach of fiduciary duty); Shawn v. England, 570 P.2d 628, 633 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977) ("If
a partner decides to dissolve a partnership and appropriate the business to himself, he must first
fully compensate his co-partner for his share of the gain to be realized from the fulfillment of a
prospective business undertaking the consummation of which is imminent.").
Appropriation cases, however, are rare, and fiduciary principles may represent a theoretical
rather than real check on the use of dissolution as a technique for squeezing out unwanted partners
when competition for the assets is nonexistent. Cf. Nicholes v. Hunt, 273 Or. 255, 541 P.2d 820
(1975); Cude v. Counch, 588 S.W.2d 554, 555-57 (Tenn. 1979). Similar techniques are applied
in corporate settings. See F. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS 5

5.21 (1985).
135. The term commonly is used to describe contracts as reflecting moral obligations to perform. As so employed, the term probably is unobjectionable. However, the implication that contrary
views represent amoral, or even immoral, approaches to contracts is unfortunate.
136. Linzer, supra note 89, at 112-13.
137. Id. at 116.
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assess."""8 The difficulties in applying an efficiency analysis are demonstrated
by the existence of opposing views on the efficiency of the remedy of specific
39
performance.'
In conclusions if not in premises, the theories of efficiency and morality
may yield similar results. In his defense of specific performance as an efficient
remedy, Professor Schwartz observed:
[Another] reason why courts should permit promisees to elect routinely
the remedy of specific performance is that promisees possess better information than courts as to both the adequacy of damages and the difficulties of coercing performance. Promisees know better than courts
whether the damages a court is likely to award would be adequate because promisees are more familiar with the costs that breach imposes on
them. In addition, promisees generally know more about their promisors
than do courts; thus they are in a better position to predict whether
specific performance decrees would induce their promisors to render satisfactory performance. 4°
Whether viewed from the perspective of efficiency or that of morality, the
problem in the contexts of partnerships is the same - the services a partner
brings to a venture may be unique, and damages may be difficult to ascertain
and prove prospectively. Furthermore, the remedies of the UPA applicable to
premature dissolutions often do not protect the reasonable expectations of the
non-breaching partner. By focusing on the risk-aversion interests of the dissatisfied partner, the UPA renders the partnership a flawed and unstable form
of business organization.
Differences over theory notwithstanding, a trend has developed towards an
expanded use of specific performance to redress contract breaches. For example,
section 359 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts reflects a traditional and restricted view of specific performance,' 4 ' the Comment to this section suggests
a more flexible approach:
Adequacy is to some extent relative, and the modern approach is to
compare remedies to determine which is more effective in serving the
ends of justice. Such a comparison will often lead to the granting of
equitable relief. Doubts should be resolved in favor of the granting of specific
performance or injunction. 142

138. Id.
139. See supra note 119. The purpose of this discussion is not to add yet another efficiency
analysis but rather to outline the scope of the debate. Cf. Macneil, supra note 119, at 954 n.28
("It thus seems likely that the intellectual outpouring on this subject applies only to a relative
handful of actual situations. If so, should the legal system burden itself with the kinds of highcost analyses, producing very high transaction costs, both to parties and society generally, required

by microeconomic analysis of this kind? Or would it not be far better to ignore all the sophistication
in favor of historical or more intuitive solutions?").
140. Schwartz, supra note 113, at 277.
141. "Specific performance or an injunction will not be ordered if damages would be adequate
to protect the expectation interest of the injured party." RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTs §
359(1) (1981).
142. Id. 5 359, comment a (emphasis added). For a discussion of the background of both
section 359 and comment a, see Linzer, supra note 89, at 120-26.
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A number of decisions reflect this "modern" and flexible approach to remedies. 4' For example, some courts recently have decreed specific performance,
notwithstanding the apparent adequacy of damages, in cases involving teacher
reinstatement, 4 1 construction contracts,' 4' and loans.' 46 Professor Linzer has observed that these cases display a tendency to consider "the full cost to promisees
of nonperformance and the real value to them of the bargain that they made.
In addition, there is often a hint of the view that people should be held to
their promises, and that the only effective way to do this is to grant specific
performance."' 47
This trend towards specific enforcement of contracts has obvious relevance
to partnership dissolutions. In its observation that there exists "a strong presumption against" the availability of the remedy, the First Circuit in Infusaid
quite clearly reflected the traditional approach outlined in the Restatement (Second)
of Contracts. Other courts, however, might choose the more flexible approach
outlined in the Comment and, after balancing equities, resolve doubts in favor
of specific performance. Although the UPA does not support such an approach,
the problem of insuring that the expectations of the non-breaching partner are
not frustrated because of a premature dissolution requires that partnership law
not preclude specific performance merely because the contract is in the form
of a partnership agreement.
C.

The Case of Personal Services

The Infusaid observation that specific performance is inappropriate unless
relationship is found to be without a significant personal services

"the

component'''" reflects the traditional reluctance of courts to specifically enforce
personal service contracts. ' 49 This limitation is most commonly justified by concerns over involuntary servitude, the impracticability of judicial supervision,
and the impossibility of compelling cooperation between antagonistic parties.'"
The personal services limitation represents the most sensible restriction on relief
in the form of specific performance.' "

143. These cases are collected and evaluated in Linzer, supra note 89, at 126-30. Other commentators have observed this trend. See, e.g., Van Hecke, Changing Emphasis in Specific Performance,
40 N.C.L. REv. 1 (1961).
144. See, e.g., AAUP v. Bloomfield College, 136 N.J. Super. 442, 448, 346 A.2d 615, 618
(App. Div. 1975) ("In view of the uncertainty in measuring damages because of the indefinite
duration of the contract and the importance of the status of plaintiffs in the milieu of the college
teaching profession, it is evident that the remedy of damages at law would not be complete or
adequate.").
145. See, e.g., Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. Zykan, 495 S.W.2d 643 (Mo. 1973). See
generally D. DOBBS, supra note 126, § 12.22.
146. See, e.g., Cuna Mut. Ins Soc'y v. Dominguez, 9 Ariz. App. 172, 450 P.2d 413 (1969);
Vandeventer v. Dale Constr. Co., 271 Or. 691, 534 P.2d 183 (1975).
147. Linzer, supra note 89, at 130 (emphasis in original).
148. 739 F.2d at 669.
149. See generally D. DOBBS, supra note 126, § 2.5, at 63; Van Hecke, supra note 143, at 1620.
150. See D. DOBBS, supra note 126, § 2.5, at 63; Van Hecke, supra note 143, at 16.
151.
Cf. Schwartz, supra note 113, at 296-98 (concluding that efficiency considerations justify
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Application of the personal service limitation to partnerships requires a caseby-case analysis. Some partners, for example, are indistinguishable from employees, and in such ventures the personal nature of the services may prove
an effective bar against specific performance. 5 2 Other partners provide little or
no personal services, and if the reasoning of Infusaid is accepted, specific performance may prove to be a significant remedy to redress breaches of agree53
ments covering such ventures.
The difficult cases lie between these two extremes. The expectation that
partners in a particular venture are expected to provide "services" does not
necessarily foreclose, without further consideration, the remedy of specific performance. A minority of courts, for example, has granted specific performance
of building and construction contracts. 54 Such cases generally have not involved
partnerships, but they nevertheless have relevance to partnerships formed to
develop real estate.'5 5 The character of "services," in short, must be evaluated
in light of legitimate reasons for denying the remedy of specific performance.
Particularly when the compulsion of personal services is not a major issue, the
remedy of specific performance as a means of curing breach of a partnership
5 6
agreement may prove appropriate.'
III.

WHAT CAN PARTNERS

Do?

THE PLANNING PERSPECTIVE

Although the UPA renders all partnerships freely dissolvable, stability is
sometimes an important objective of business partners. '57 Given the apparent

a more liberal use of specific performance but adding that liberty considerations mitigate against
the remedy in some situations in which it is now available).
152. See generally D. DoBBs, supra note 126, §§ 12.25-.26; Van Hecke, supra note 143, at
14-20. For a case holding the employer did not have the power to terminate an employment contract,
see Jones v. Williams, 139 Mo. 1, 39 S.W. 486 (1897) (employee was also a stockholder in employer
corporation).
153. This article assumes, perhaps unjustifiably, the validity of judicial supervision, personal
liberty, and the impossibility of compelling cooperation as supportable restrictions on the availability
of specific performance. Particularly with respect to the latter two restrictions, further analysis should
be undertaken. For example, "personal liberty" is a general concept that should be refined (but
not necessarily limited) to have meaning in the contexts of both contract and partnership laws.
Further, if specific performance is more widely available, it is possible that otherwise antagonistic
parties would have an incentive to cooperate.
154. See supra note 145.
155. Because of tax advantages, many real estate ventures are operated as partnerships.
156. Specific performance of partnership agreements would create special problems when the
character of contributions of partners within a venture vary substantially. Assume, for example, a
fixed term partnership consists of two individuals, A and B. A's contribution consists of capital
and his good reputation; he does not perform services for the venture. B breaches the agreement
prior to the expiration of its term. The remedy of specific performance is doubtful because the
subject of the decree is personal services. But what if the breach is by A instead of B? In this
case, personal services are not an issue. B, assuming for the sake of this example the inadequacy
of damages, may compel completion of the agreed term. In such event, only one partner, B, has
the power to dissolve prematurely, a result made possible by the demise of the mutuality of remedy
doctrine but perhaps not contemplated by the two partners at the inception of their relationship.
157. The lack of stability in the partnership form of organization often prompts individuals
to incorporate their ventures.
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conflict between the free dissolution posture of the UPA and the desire of some
partners to stabilize their relationships, the question becomes: What can partners
do, short of incorporation, to eliminate or minimize the risk of premature
dissolution?'
Some measure of stability may be provided through effective business planning. Unlike corporations, partnerships are stabilized, to the degree possible,
largely through contract rather than statute.' 5 9 This requires individuals forming
a partnership to recognize the fragile nature of their form of business association." "' Facilitating sensible planning is the high degree of cooperation that
normally exists at the inception of a partnership.' 6' Too frequently, however,
partnerships are established informally and without any measurable degree of
planning; 62 in such cases, the opportunity to address major issues is more
6
theoretical than real.' '
Probably the most important method of achieving some degree of stability
is the establishment of a fixed partnership term. 4 This will not render a partnership indissolvable, but, in many cases, it will increase the "costs" assigned
to a partner desiring a premature, wrongful dissolution. However, when those
"costs" become acceptable to a dissatisfied partner, that partner effectively
enjoys the option, and often the incentive, 65 to dissolve the partnership in
violation of the partnership agreement. Accordingly, more than a simple agreement concerning the term of the partnership may be necessary to provide meaningful disincentives to dissolution.
Sometimes, partnership agreements establish a fixed term and include a
provision rendering ineffective attempts to dissolve before the expiration of the
term. While this is clear evidence of the intent of the partners, it nevertheless
is meaningless in light of the distinction drawn under partnership law between

158. The inquiry is directed to planning alternatives that should be considered at the inception
of a partnership. During the life of a partnership, one thing partners may do to avoid premature
dissolution is attempt to accommodate the desires of the least satisfied partner. The degree to which
the law should, as it now does, encourage such action is open to question. See infra notes 187-90
and accompanying text.
159. See Hillman, supra note 17, at 61-87.
160. See, e.g., M. VOLZ & A. BERGER, THE DRAFTING OF PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS 13-16
(1976) (discussing the importance of a well-drafted partnership agreement).
161.
Cf. Worcester, The Drafting of PartnershipAgreements, 63 HARV. L. REV. 985, 986 (1950)
("Since a partnership is an extremely intimate relationship, perhaps the greatest potential problem
is the risk of future disagreement among those who start out with the highest mutual regard.")
162. No formalities are required to create a partnership, and the ease with which the relationship can be established often undermines any deliberative business planning. For a further
discussion of this point, see Hillman. supra note 17, at 16-19.
163. In the absence of a clear written or oral agreement, courts may infer terms. For a
discussion of the implication of partnership terms, see id. at 16-33.
164. Defining the undertaking rather than the term may also provide a measure of stability.
165. An incentive to dissolve might arise, for example, when a partner does not wish to share
opportunities with other partners. Most courts would agree that a dissolution for the purpose of
misappropriating partnership opportunities is a breach of fiduciary duties. Enforcement of fiduciary
responsibilities, however, may prove problematic. See supra note 134. If the partner is not permitted
to dissolve the partnership, fiduciary responsibilities continue, and the position of the other partners
may be improved. See infranotes 211-213 and accompanying text.
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the power and the right to dissolve. It is both ironic and unfortunate that the
same statute which subordinates most of its norms to contrary agreements among
the partners also precludes any attempt by partners to waive by agreement
their powers of dissolution.'

66

Even a clearer expression of intent may prove ineffective. Suppose, for example, a partnership agreement establishes a term, provides that no partner
has the power to dissolve prior to the expiration of that term, and adds that
if any partner attempts to dissolve or otherwise withdraw, the partnership agreement may be specifically enforced against that partner. Two obstacles face the
non-breaching partner seeking to enforce such an agreement. First, the UPA
does not permit a waiver of the power of dissolution. Second, even though
contracting parties freely agree to a provision giving the non-breaching party
the right to secure specific enforcement of the agreement, most courts do not
view such provisions as binding.' 67 This type of an agreement, if properly
drafted, may render specific performance of the non-partnership contract more
likely, but it cannot insure the availability of the remedy in the event of a
6

breach.'

Enforceability problems should not deter partners otherwise desiring the remedy of specific performance from including appropriate provisions in their agreement. A specific enforcement clause can only increase the possibility that equitable
relief will be available, particularly if a court follows the Infusaid lead and treats
partnership dissolution as a problem of remedies rather than a question of
partnership law. Further, a well drafted clause tailored to the peculiar circum-

166.

Arbitration clauses, which are commonly used in partnership agreements, do not restrict

the power of a partner to dissolve. See Wolf v. Baltimore, 250 Pa. Super. 230, 378 A.2d 911

(1977).
167.

Although an agreement attempting to give the non-breaching party the right to compel

specific
matter
(1955).
court's

performance will be given some weight, a court will nevertheless treat the remedy as a
of judicial discretion. The leading case is Stokes v. Moore, 262 Ala. 59, 77 So. 2d 331
Although Stokes involved an employment contract rather than a partnership agreement, the
comments are nevertheless relevant to partners:

We do not wish to express the view that an agreement for the issuance of an injunction,

if and when a stipulated set of facts arises in the future, is binding on the court to that
extent. Such an agreement would serve to oust the inherent jurisdiction of the court to
determine whether an injunction is appropriate when applied for and to require its issuance
even though to do so would be contrary to the opinion of the court.
Id. at 61, 77 So. 2d at 334. See generally D. DoaBs, supra note 126, S 12.5, at 825 (indicating there
is 'no clear answer" to the issue of whether a party may contractually agree to specific performance
or an injunction against breach); Kronman, supra note 119, at 369-76 (discussing the relationship
between specific performance and freedom of contract); Macneil, Power of Contract and Agreed Remedies,
47 CORNELL L.Q. 495, 520-23 (1962) (explaining why specific performance clauses are a rarity).

168. Speaking generally of contractual provisions for specific performance, Professor Kronman
has observed:
A contractual provision accompanied by a lengthy description of those aspects of the transaction that makes specific performance desirable is likely to carry more weight than a
provision unadorned by supporting explanation. But in no event will the contract provision
prevent a court from independently determining the appropriateness of injunctive relief.
Kronman, supra note 119, at 371; see also Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale
of Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article II, 73 YALE LJ. 199, 252 (1963).
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stances of the partnership and including a statement indicating why specific
performance is appropriate will focus the partners' attention at an early stage
on their expectations for the duration of the venture. Used in this fashion, the
agreement serves both to spell out the rights and responsibilities of the parties,
and to educate the partners by providing them with the occasion to evaluate
carefully their mutual expectations.
Partners may also attempt by agreement to alter the consequences of dissolution. For example, a partnership agreement may provide for a continuation
of the business following a dissolution and the deferred payout, often on an
installment basis, of the dissolving partner's interest. Such an understanding,
which is generally referred to as a continuation agreement, strikes a balance
between stability and liquidity interests. Continuation agreements, however, are
most appropriately utilized in anticipation of either the death of a partner"'" or
the dissolution of a partnership which is terminable at will.' 7" Used more broadly
as a response to the premature and wrongful dissolution of a fixed term partnership, such agreements normally leave the continuing partner in a position
inferior to that resulting from imposition of the wrongful dissolution sanctions
of the UPA."'
More meaningful stability provisions are found in the covenants not to compete often included in partnership agreements."'7 These devices are particularly
common in partnerships among professionals,'71 although they also appear in

169. See generally Bromberg, Partnership Dissolution - Causes, Consequences, and Cures, 43 TEx. L.
REV. 631, 653-59 (1965); Fuller, Partnership Agreements for Continuation of an Enterprise After the Death
of a Partner, 52 YALE L.J. 202 (1940); Note, Partnership Continuation Agreements, 72 HARV. L. REV.
1302 (1959).
170. Because the dissolution of such a partnership is not "in contravention of the partnership
agreement," UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 38(1), it will not activate the wrongful dissolution sanctions
of the UPA. See generally Hillman, supra note 10, at 537-39.
171.
This is because the continuation agreement will probably modify the deferred payout
provisions of the UPA and provide greater liquidity than the statute would accord. An alternative
is to provide for liquidated damages in the event of a premature dissolution. See, e.g., Beck,
Formalizing the Farm Partnership, 54 NEB. L. REV. 558, 564 (1975) (advising partners they may wish
to provide an "exacting measure of damages in the formalized partnership agreement"); see also
Goetz & Scott, supra note 119 (arguing that in most circumstances efficiency would be maximized
by the enforcement of the agreed allocations of risks reflected in a liquidated damages clause).
The enforceability of liquidated damages clauses relating to partnership dissolutions is beyond
the scope of this article. Note, however, that the task of developing a reasonable forecast of damages
from a premature partnership dissolution often will prove difficult, if not impossible. The complexity
increases in proportion to the number of partners, to the degree contributions by partners vary,
and as the length of the partnership term increases.
172. See, e.g., D. FESSLER, supia note 50, at 117 ("[I]t is the willingness of courts to tolerate
definite non-competition clauses in partnership agreements that more than any single factor, stabilizes
the relationship."). Enforcement of a non-competition clause may complement the right of the
partner not causing the wrongful dissolution to continue the business and settle the account of the
breaching partner without regard to the value of that partner's interest in goodwill. See supra note
14.
173. See, eg., Gibson v. Angros, 491 P.2d 87 (Colo. App. 1971) (medical partnership); Akey
v. Murphy, 238 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 1970) (medical partnership); Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 800, 263
S.E.2d 430 (1980) (accounting firm).
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other contexts.17 4 Typically, such covenants provide that, in the event of a
premature dissolution, the dissolving partner' 75 is precluded from engaging in
activities, in a defined area, which will compete with those of the partnership.
The clauses, which are used in both fixed term and terminable at will partnerships, often restrict activities following the withdrawal from a partnership
for any reason.' 7 6 Breach of a covenant not to compete may give the protected
77
partner the option of either seeking damages or pursuing injunctive relief.'
Such clauses, which occasionally are accompanied by liquidated damages provisions, 17 may present, if enforceable, 179 significant disincentives to dissolution.
For this reason, noncompetition covenants, together with agreements establishing

174. See,e.g., Habif v. Maslia, 214 Ga. 654, 106 S.E.2d 905 (1959) (partnership sold and
serviced automobile motors); Brower v. Johnson, 56 Wash. 2d 321, 352 P.2d 814 (1960) (amusement
park partnership).
175. Covenants not to compete are sometimes drafted to apply only to certain partners within
the* venture. See, e.g., Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416, 417 (Tex. 1983); Willman v.
Bcheler, 499 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Mo. 1973); but cf. Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Medical Ass'n, 253 Ga.
331, 320 S.E.2d 168 (1984) (distinguishing restrictive convenants in employment agreements from
those in partnership agreements and justifying the latter because the restrictions are mutual).
176. A consideration of the content and enforceability of convenants not to compete will not
be undertaken in this article. For a discussion of the issue, see W. WILLISTON, A TREASTISE ON THE
LAw OF CONTRACrs SS 1633-1644 (W. Jaeger 3d ed. 1972). It is noteworthy, however, that many
jurisdictions generally limiting or prohibiting enforcement of contracts restricting trade, professional
or business activities nevertheless provide favorable treatment for certain of such agreements drafted
in anticipation of partnership dissolutions. See id. S 1644. This is sometimes provided by statute.
See, e.g., ALA. CoDE § 8-1-1 (1984); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 16602 (West 1964); FLA. STAT.
5 542.33 (1983); N.D. CEsr. CODE § 9-08-06 (1975); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 219 (West

1966).
Under common law standards, enforceability of covenants not to compete often depends upon
.the reasonableness of the restriction. Factors considered include the nature of the business, the
manner in which it has been conducted, the time limit of the restriction, and the territorial scope
of the restriction. Overly broad restrictions may prove unenforceable. See, e.g., Creter v. Creter,
52 NJ. Super. 197, 145 A.2d 149 (1958) (restraint of competition anywhere in the state is too
broad); cf. Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 800, 806, 263 S.E.2d 430, 434 (1980) (In upholding a noncompetition clause providing for the payment of a percentage of fees collected from former clients
of the partnership, the court noted: "Important to our decision here is the fact that the partnership
agreement does not prohibit [the former partner] from practicing his profession in Roanoke or
elsewhere. ..").
177. See, e.g., Rash v. Toccoa Clinic Medical Assocs., 253 Ga. 322, 320 S.E.2d 170 (1984);
cf. Bauer v. Sawyer, 8 Il.2d 351, 358, 134 N.E.2d 329, 333 (1956) ("[E]ven if the provision in
question is construed as one for liquidated damages the right to an injunction is not barred.").
But cf. Thompson v. Allain, 377 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (suggesting that courts
in equity enforce non-competition clauses because "there is no adequate remedy at law, and ...
the object of the contract can be attained only by the parties conforming expressly and exactly to
its terms").
178. See, e.g., Henshaw v. Kroenecke, 656 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. 1983) (agreement for partnership
terminable at will provided for liquidated damages, but not injunctive relief, against specified partner
in an amount equal to 12 times the average monthly billing to each client with whom the partner
conducts business following the termination); Foti v. Cook, 220 Va. 800, 263 S.E.2d 430 (1980)
(covenant restricted performance of services for clients of firm and provided that if such services
were performed, the former partner would pay the partnership a percentage of the fee collected).
But cf. Thompson v. Allain, 377 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964) (quoted supra note 177).
179. See supra note 176.
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a term, constitute the principal contractual means of providing some stability
to partnerships.

IV.

AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE:

LESSONS

FROM THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS

The lore of partnership law emphasizes the contract as a basis for regulating
the legal relationships among partners. The UPA is replete with provisions
permitting partners to arrange their affairs in a fashion at variance with the
otherwise applicable provisions of the Act." ' Because the partnership agreement
cannot effectively restrict the power of any partner to dissolve the venture,
however, the freedom to alter statutory norms by contract is limited. The issue
thus becomes: Should the right to alter statutory norms be extended to include
restrictions on the power to dissolve when all partners so agree?
A useful point of comparison is provided by the incorporated counterpart
of the partnership - the close corporation. Admittedly, using corporate law as
a model for the reform of partnership law is unusual, for many recent reforms
of the law applicable to close corporations have utilized the UPA as a sensible
set of legal norms for the management of small, intimate business ventures." '
Nevertheless, the intensive scrutiny given problems of close corporations in
recent years justifies a comparative evaluation of the laws affecting dissolution
of these two very similar types of business organizations.
No jurisdiction provides for free dissolvability of a close corporation by the
unilateral declaration of a single, minority shareholder.' 12 Most jurisdictions
divide corporate dissolutions into two categories: voluntary and involuntary.
Voluntary dissolutions occur when the holders of a requisite percentage of shares,
typically a majority, vote to dissolve their corporations."' Involuntary dissolutions are occasioned by considerations of equity or necessity, such as deadlock,
severe dissension, fraud, or oppression of minority shareholders. " ' A number
of cases " ' and commentators"'b have suggested that these traditional grounds
180. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
181. See, e.g., Israels, The Close Corporation and the Law, 33 CORNELL L.Q. 488, 488 (1948)
("[Tlhe participants [in a close corporation] consider themselves 'partners' and seek to conduct the
corporate affairs to a greater or lesser extent in the manner of a partnership "); id. at 491 (the
"objective of the participants in a close corporation is to equate the scheme of governance of their
enterprise to that of a partnership").
182. In some states, however, free dissolvability may be approximated through provisions in
the articles of incorporation authorizing dissolution on the demand of a single shareholder. Set,
e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 355 (1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 1002 (McKinney 1963).
183. See supra note 18.
184. See generally Hillman, supra note 17, at 38-55.
185. See, e.g., Capitol Toyota, Inc. v. Gervin, 381 So. 2d 1038 (Miss. 1980); Meiselman v.
Meiselman, 309 N.C. 279, 307 S.E.2d 551 (1983); Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167
N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d 554 (Ct. Law. Div. 1979), aff'd N.J. Super. 559, 414 A.2d 994 (Ct.
App. Div. 1980); In re Taines, Il1 Misc. 2d 559, 444 N.Y.S.2d 540 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Topper v.
Park Sheraton Pharmacy, Inc., 107 Misc. 2d 25, 433 N.Y.S.2d 359 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
186. See, e.g., Afterman, Statuto9 Protectionfor Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for Reform,
55 VA. L. REV. 1043 (1969); Hillman, supra note 17, at 49-55, 75-87; O'Neal, Close Corporations
Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW. 873, 885-88 (1978).
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of relief for disgruntled minority shareholders are too narrow and that minority
shareholders should be permitted to compel dissolution of their ventures under
8 7
circumstances in which their reasonable expectations have been frustrated.'
Indeed, some commentators have gone even farther and argued a close corporation should, like a partnership, be freely dissolvable at the will of any of
its owners.'8
Free dissolvability is not a widely accepted principle of corporate law. Even
the less revolutionary concept of dissolution based upon a frustration of expectations represents a minority, although perhaps growing, approach to corporate dissolutions. What, then, is it about the close corporation that justifies
an approach restricting the ability of a minority participant to compel a dissolution? Is this aspect of corporate law in need of further reform? Should
dissolution of partnerships resemble more closely that of corporation? Or should
a unified, middle ground be sought, with a relaxation of grounds for corporate
dissolution and a tightening of the circumstances under which fixed term partnerships can be dissolved in breach of contract at the instance of a single
participant?18 9
Some may attempt to dismiss the analogy with a close corporation because
of the supposed uniqueness of partnerships. The argument might be that partne;s, unlike shareholders, suffer a greater risk because of their potential unlimited liability for the acts of others within their ventures. Because of this risk,
or so the argument might go, partners must have a means of dissolving their
ventures immediately. Such an argument, however, ignores the precarious positions of many shareholders in close corporations. Often, the shareholder in a
close corporation has invested a substantial amount of capital and labor. This
is subject to loss and therefore at risk. If the amount invested is a large percentage of the shareholder's net worth, as frequently is the case in close corporations, it is difficult to draw a distinction between the risk of the shareholder
and that of the partner. Further, shareholders often personally guarantee the

187.

At least one modem dissolution statute recognizes the importance of expectations. See
S 302A.751, subd. 3a (West 1985) ("In determining whether to order equitable

MINN. STAT. ANN.

relief, dissolution, or a buy-out, the court shall take into consideration the duty which all shareholders in a closely-held corporation owe one another to act in an honest, fair, and reasonable
manner in the operation of the corporation and the reasonable expectations of the shareholders as
they exist at the inception and develop during the course of the shareholders' relationship with the
corporation and with each other."); see generally Olson, Statutory Changes Improve Position of Minoriy

Shareholders in Closely-Held Corporations, THE HENNEPIN LAw. (Sept.-Oct. 1983). Cf. CAL. CORP. CODE
S 1800(b)(5) (West 1977) (permitting involuntary dissolution if "liquidation is reasonably necessary
for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder or shareholders"); N.C.
GEN. STAT. S 55-125(a)(4) (1982) (permitting involuntary dissolution if "liquidation is reasonably
necessary for the protection of the rights or interests of the complaining shareholder").

188. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 47. Under this approach, the shareholders desiring
to avoid corporate dissolution could do so by purchasing the interest of the dissatisfied shareholder.
This theory is evaluated in Hillman, supra note 17, at 69-75.
189. For an argument in favor of a unified structural, tax, and securities framework for small
businesses, see Haynsworth, The Need for a Unified Small Business Legal Structure, 33 Bus. LAw. 849

(1978); see also Kessler, With Limited Liability for All: Why Not a Partnership Corporation?, 36
L. REv. 235 (1967).
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debts of their corporation. To the extent of such guarantees, the interests and
risks of the shareholder approximate those of the partner.
One argument in favor of extending the principle of free dissolvability to
close corporations is that the ability of any owner to force a dissolution would
prompt controlling shareholders to accommodate the needs of minority participants. Admittedly, this would redress quite effectively some of the grosser
abuses inflicted on minority shareholders in close corporations. However, such
a reform of corporate law would go too far. By focusing on the liquidity interests
of minority shareholders, free dissolvability ignores the stability interests of
shareholders, both minority and controlling, satisfied with the management of
their enterprises.
A more appropriate method of reforming corporate law is to relax, but not
eliminate, the traditional standards for involuntary dissolution of a close corporation. Expectations, not culpability, should be the relevant target of inquiry
in most cases in which minority participants desire dissolution. To the extent
that a minority shareholder had reasonable expectations at the inception of a
venture, those expectations were understood by other participants in the enterprise, and the prospect that the expectations will be realized is remote, dissolution or a mandatory buy-out of the participant's interest may represent a
sensible compromise between liquidity and stability interests in the close corporation setting.190
Much of the same analysis can be applied to partnerships. A partnership
does not need to be a flawed and inherently unstable relationship when all of
the partners agree to provide a measure of permanence to the venture. They
should be able to do this by establishing a fixed term or specifying a particular
undertaking. The preoccupation of the UPA with risk-aversion considerations
is unnecessary when partners bargain to subordinate those concerns to considerations of stability. In such cases, premature dissolution should still be possible
- not by a unilateral expression by one partner, but rather upon the occurrence
of another of the events of dissolution specified in section 31 of the UPA.
Accordingly, neither the UPA nor corporate law serves as an appropriate
model for the reform of standards generally applicable to the dissolution of
closely held business ventures.'
Each body of law should more closely approximate the other, with a middle ground established to facilitate the development of a unified, but not necessarily singular, legal structure for the dissolution
of both partnerships and close corporations. Along this line, the following section
offers some suggestions for the reform of partnership law.

190. This approach is developed more fully in Hillman, supra note 17, at 69-87
191. Arguably, the standards of dissolution should be even more relaxed for close corporations
than partnerships. Corporations normally have an unlimited life, and shareholders typically do not
bargain on the issue of a term. When a venture is established for a defined term, as is the case
with fixed term partnerships, a dissatisfied participant need only await the expiration of the term.
The disgruntled shareholder does not enjoy a similar privilege.
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V.

REFORMING PARTNERSHIP LAW CONCERNING DISSOLUTIONS:
ADDRESSING

A.

THE EXCESSES OF FREE DISSOLVABILITY

Defining the Role of the Agreement

One of the more attractive features of partnership law is the flexibility it
gives partners to tailor the legal structure of their ventures to the needs of the
participants. 92 Ideally, partners exercise this flexibility through bargaining, the
result of which is a contract. 93 However, a contract, at least in the form of
a written agreement, cannot address all potential disputes among partners. Indeed, to use a written agreement as a detailed statement of principles of business
governance would generate unacceptable transaction costs and, in most cases,
prove unsuccessful.
This problem inherent in bargaining at the inception of a venture results
from the complex nature of business governance. The relationship among partners is infinitely more complicated than that of parties to more typical and
limited contracts. 9 4 For this reason, the partnership agreement is, at best, an
unusual type of contract, 95 and bargaining necessarily is limited. Of course,
this leaves a gap between the generality of the formal partnership agreement,
which is the product of the bargaining, and the many potential controversies
arising in day-to-day management. To a large extent, the gap is filled adequately

192.

This feature of partnership law has had an important influence on the reform of the law

applicable to close corporations. See, e.g., 1 F. O'NFAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE

5 1.14(a)-(b) (2d ed. 1971); Israels, supra note 181, at 491: Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems:
Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259, 284 (1967).
193. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
194. This is clearest in the case of a short term contract for the sale of goods. The relationship
among parties to some long term contracts, however, may create conflict between the needs for
planning and flexibility. This gives rise to the relational model of contracts:
In many exchange transactions, some aspects of the projection are complete and some
are not. In a twenty year contract for the supply of coal, the subject, pricing formula,
method of delivery, and duration may be spelled out. The relationship is relatively impersonal, tangible exchange is important, and a competitive market for coal may exist.
On the other hand, the length of the contract puts strains on any effort to achieve complete
initial protection. Despite careful negotiations and detailed planning, the initial agreement
will probably fail to keep pace with change. At the same time, the transaction, because
of high exit costs and specialized reliance, may be removed from the market. When these
features are understood, the relational dimensions of the transaction come into sharper
focus.. .. Both parties should understand at the outset that the long-term viability of the
contract will depend upon continuing cooperation in performance and subsequent planning.
Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. 369,
401 (1981). See generally Gillette, Commercial Rationality and the Duty to Adjust Long-Term Contracts, 69
MINN. L. REv. 521 (1985); Macneil, Values in Contract: Internal and External, 78 Nw. U.L. REv.
340 (1983); Macneil, Contracts: Adjustment of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical, Neoclassical
and Relational Contract Law, 72 Nw. U.L. REv. 854 (1978); [hereinafter cited as Adjustment]; Macneil,
The Many Futures of Contracts, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 691 (1974).
195. Commentators on the law of contracts have observed that this problem also arises in
some long-term commercial contracts, which may be relational rather than discrete "to the extent
that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of the arrangement to well-defined
obligations." Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REv. 1089, 1091 (1981).
See also note 194, supra.
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by statutory norms of business governance, such as the principle that differences
concerning matters in the ordinary course of business are to be resolved by
majority vote."' Such norms supply the standard of good faith applicable to
the conduct of partners. 97'
Although they suffer some limitations, partnership agreements do serve an
important function as constitutional documents for the governance of a partnership."' As such, they should address the broad issues affecting the partners,
including identity of the partners, division of profits and losses, centralization
of management, allocation of responsibilities, processes for decisionmaking, the
consequences of the death of a partner, and, importantly, the duration of the
venture. These issues, and not the minutiae of business governance, should
occupy the attention of the partners as they attempt to develop a consensus on
the structuring of their ventures.' 99
Unfortunately, many partnerships are formed on the basis of implied or
half-articulated understandings. Too often, written agreements offer little improvement. Some lawyers approach the preparation of partnership agreements
in a mechanical fashion and seek only slight refinements of supposedly well
tested boilerplate clauses. In these cases, the partners are expected to adapt to
the forms. While this approach may lower certain costs, it does not result in
the type of constitutional document and statement of consensus that a partnership agreement should represent.2 " ' Focusing on important issues requiring
a true consensus rather than the details of business governance would permit
-partners to streamline the negotiating process and result in more meaningful
and understandable partnership agreements.

196. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT f) 18(h).
197. See infra note 212; see also A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 68, at 389-90 ("The main
elements of [the fiduciary duty] aie well recognized: utmost good faith, fairness, loyalty."). See
generally Note, Fiduciary Duties of Partners, 48 IOWA L. REV. 902 (1963). For an excellent general

discussion of the nature of fiduciary relations and the rules that govern them, see Frankel, Fiduciary
Law, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 795 (1983).
198. Cf Adjustment, supra note 194, at 894 ("I feel some temptation to think of the written
parts of contractual relations, especially very formal parts, such as collective bargaining agreements
and corporate charters and bylaws, as constitutions establishing legislative and administrative process
for the relation ....
[But] if that concept or terminology is used to resurrect 'constitutions' long
decayed and made obsolete ....
we are, as a matter of principle, back to a relationally dysfunctional
neoclassicism."); Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REV. 3, 5 (noting the
unique, constitutional quality of a collective bargaining agreement and adding that the task of the
arbitrator is "not to bend the dispute to the agreement, but to bend the agreement to the unfolding
needs of industrial life").
199. This is not to say that partnership agreements should not deal specifically with more
detailed matters affecting management. In some cases, the benefits of such specificity outweigh the
transaction costs.
200. Cf. Fessler, The Fate of Closely Held Business Associations: The Debatable Wisdom of Incorporation,
13 U.C.D. L. REV. 473, 483 n.22 (1980) ("Perhaps it is appropriate that the lack of considered
reasoning that is often behind the decision to incorporate can now be matched by an absence of
particularized drafting in the crucial process of incorporation.").
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B.

The Agreement as to Term: A Role for Indissoluble Partnerships

What effect, then, is to be given an agreement concerning life of a partnership? The issue of duration is easily understood by those negotiating a partnership agreement. Admittedly, partners may have difficulty identifying the
types of future disputes that may lead one or more partners to become dissatisfied. Most partners, however, understand that serious differences may arise
and are in a position to evaluate their relative interests in stability, risk-aversion,
and liquidity. The duration question is a fundamental matter on which the law
should facilitate bargaining.
Because an agreement concerning duration is normally reached as a method
of stabilizing a partnership, it should be given just that effect. If permitted to
bargain effectively on this issue, partners most concerned with the adverse consequences of an early dissolution could pay the price for, and enjoy the benefits
of, stability. 20 1 Partnership law can facilitate this objective by denying a partner
the unilateral power to dissolve a partnership by express will prior to the expiration of the term previously accepted by that partner. An agreement concerning duration, in short, should effectively deny a partner the power to
22
unilaterally cause a premature dissolution through an expression of will. 11 If

cause exists, the dissatisfied partner may seek a decree of dissolution.
One objection to such a reform of the UPA might be that free dissolvability
encourages the accommodation of the desires of the least satisfied partner. A
similar argument has been offered to support the free dissolvability of close
corporations. 2 3 The problem with this argument lies in its premise. If it is
assumed that the cause of dissatisfaction in a business venture invariably is
oppressive, arbitrary, or similarly culpable conduct by those in control, then
free dissolvability is an important, and expeditious, method of protecting a
minority participant from abuse. The reasons for dissatisfaction, however, are
varied and may be unrelated to actions by others within the venture. To permit
a dissolution regardless of the effect on the remaining participants represents
an unwarranted preoccupation with the interests of a single, disgruntled participant.
201. Several possibilities may be addressed in bargaining. First, partners can establish a venture
terminable at the will of any of its members. Second, they can establish a fixed term partnership
utilizing the premature dissolution provisions of the UPA. In the latter case, each partner would
retain the power but not the right to dissolve the partnership. Alternatively, the power of each
partner to cause a premature dissolution could be retained but different economic consequences
than those provided by the UPA could be assigned. Partners should also be permitted to pursue
a stabilizing alternative not presently available by making the partnership more closely approximate

a corporation, at least for the agreed term. Further, partners may wish to vary the dissolvability
of the venture depending upon the partner desiring to withdraw.

202. This would mean a partnership would continue absent some event of dissolution other
than an expression of will. It may still necessitate relief in the form of specific performance with
respect to certain of the obligations of partners, however. Other methods of causing a premature
dissolution, such as a judicial decree upon a showing of cause, death or bankruptcy of a partner,
or the express will of all partners would remain applicable. See infra notes 214-17 and accompanying

text. The balance of the discussion will assume that the dissatisfied partner's ability to effect a
premature dissolution is limited to a judicial decree.
203. See supra notes 182-90 and accompanying text.
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A second possible objection to reforming the principle of free dissolvability
concerns the increased costs ofjudicial administration of partnership dissolutions.
This objection would be most potent if the principle of free dissolvability produced negligible litigation costs. Experience has shown, however, this is not the
case. Current law shifts the focus of litigation from the question of the power
of a partner to dissolve to the issue of the consequences of the dissolution. This
is evident in the considerable number of cases addressing the wrongfulness of
dissolutions. 2"4 The very uncertainty concerning the consequences of dissolution
through an expression of will causes many partners to forego self-help and seek
decrees of dissolution."" Indeed, the implementing mechanism of free dissolvability, dissolution through an expression of will, is best regarded as a very
risky course of action. If the proposed reform of the UPA increases litigation
costs, and this is by no means certain, the increase in costs would not likely
be so substantial as to override other valid reasons for permitting partners to
stabilize their relationships.
A third, and more persuasive, objection may be offered. Requiring a judicial
decree to effect a premature dissolution may increase the risk of the dissatisfied
partner. The ability to terminate risk promptly is probably the principal justification for the current law supporting free dissolvability. "°" By denying the
dissatisfied partner the power to dissolve unilaterally, the partner may remain
at risk for the actions of others during the full term of the partnership. Even
if that partner has sufficient grounds to secure a decree of dissolution, a substantial period of time may elapse between the decision to dissolve and the date
that objective is accomplished. During this period, the partner is at risk.
The ability to terminate risk, however, is not the sole objective worthy of
protection by partnership law. When the partner seeking to terminate risk has
previously agreed to a term for the partnership, then the risk-aversion interests
of the one partner must be balanced against the legitimate objectives of the
other partners. If the reported litigation on partnership dissolution demonstrated
a recurring pattern of partners instigating dissolution to protect themselves from
the risky decisions of their fellow-venturers, then risk-aversion interests should
be treated as of paramount importance. Such, however, is not the case. Dissolution disputes rarely involve risk-avoidance concerns. More commonly, dissolution is sought because of the failure of a partner to perform obligationsz

204. See generally Hillman, supra note 10, at 536-52.
205. See, e.g., Cooper v. Issacs. 448 F.2d 1202, 1206 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("[TIhe provisions of
the Act regarding dissolution by decree of court were clearly designed to allow partners to extricate
themselves from business relationships which they felt had become intolerable without exposing
themselves to liability in the process .... ); A. BROMBERG, supra note 3, § 78, at 437 ("Judicial
dissolution is particularly suited to facts which may amount to impossibility of performance or total
breach of the partnership agreement, but which are so disputed or equivocal that automatic dissolution by operation of law, or self-help by partners would be reckless."). See generally Hillman,
supra note 10, at 539-44.
206. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
207. The UPA authorizes a decree of dissolution when a "partner wilfully or persistently
commits a breach of the partnership agreement, or otherwise so conducts himself in matters relating
to the partnership business that it is not reasonably practicable to carry on the business in partnership
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or continuing friction among the participants. 2"s This suggests that risk aversion
concerns, although worthy of consideration, should not be exaggerated.
An additional objection to requiring a judicial decree might be that a court
is powerless to force an individual to remain a partner. This, however, confuses
the issue of status with the problem of remedies. If dissolution is precluded,
specific performance should be available as a remedy to redress many, but not
all, defaults in performance by a partner. Undoubtedly a court will not compel
an individual to perform services on behalf of another, and an abandonment
of a partnership, evidenced by a withdrawal of services, normally cannot be
enjoined. However, services are distinct from status as a partner, and limitations
on the availability of the remedy of specific performance do not require the
free dissolvability of partnerships. Not all partners provide services, and not all
who abandon partnerships need to be relieved of the status and continuing
responsibilities of a "partner."
An example may serve to illustrate both the advantages and, in certain
cases, the limitations of the proposed reform. Assume a partnership consists of
three individuals, A, B, and C. The A-B-C partnership agreement provides for
a term of ten years. The agreement also contemplates varying contributions by
the partners; A and B are to perform services, while C's principal contributions
are financial and reputational in character. The partners agree to share income
and losses equally. One year passes, and C desires to effect a premature dissolution. C's reasons are not sufficient to warrant a judicial decree of dissolution.
Under existing law, A and B must be content with the imposition of wrongful
dissolution sanctions against C. Admittedly, this will permit A and B to defer
account settlement and continue the business for nine years. However, this
remedy will not necessarily restore A and B to the position they would have
been in without a dissolution. For example, losses for the next nine years are
shared by two rather than three individuals. Risk is thus shifted from C to A
and B. In addition, the required indemnification of the dissolving partner from
post-dissolution liabilities means that C's credit no longer backs the partnership.
Particularly if they cannot find a substitute partner for C, A and B may be
harmed in a fashion that a court cannot, or will not, compensate through an
award of damages based upon speculation concerning the future.
The problem becomes more complex when the partner desiring dissolution
is a significant service-provider. Assume, for example, it is B rather than C
who desires to dissolve the partnership. Under existing law, A and C are pow"9
erless to prevent the dissolution, and B is free to pursue other opportunities.
The proposed reform would prevent B from unilaterally effecting a dissolution
through an expression of will. The reform would not, however, provide a basis

PARTNERSHIP AcT S 32(1)(d); see,
N.E.2d 690 (1946) (finding domineering conduct by
lationship between the partners).
208. See, e.g., Potter v. Brown, 328 Pa. 554, 195
because the business was prosperous notwithstanding

with him." UNIF.

209.

e.g., Ferrick v. Berry, 320 Mass. 217, 68

one partner an alteration of the agreed reA. 901 (1938) (refusing to decree dissolution
the friction among partners).

See infra note 212.
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for compelling B to continue to perform services. This problem would be treated,
2 1
as it should, under the law of remedies. "
Assuming A and C cannot compel B to perform services, it nevertheless
may be in B's interest to continue active participation when the partnership
cannot be dissolved unilaterally. For example, inability to effect a dissolution
means B continues to share losses, but not necessarily income."' Further, if
the A-B-C partnership continues, B remains subject to fiduciary standards and
may therefore be required to share opportunities relating to the partnership
business with A and C.212 If this is the case, B may "voluntarily" elect to
continue active participation in the partnership. If B chooses to abandon the
partnership, it often will be in the interests of A and C to treat the abandonment
as a basis for a decree of dissolution and seek imposition of sanctions against
B for a wrongful dissolution.""' In some cases involving abandonment, however,
A and C may prefer to maintain the A-B-C partnership. If this is their choice,
it should be given effect.
The principal advantage of the proposed reform is enhanced stability for
fixed term partnerships. In some cases, however, a partner may have valid
reasons for desiring a premature dissolution. Judicial review may serve quite
effectively to evaluate the existence of cause to dissolve prior to the expiration
of the partnership term.
C.

Dissolution for Cause

Dissolution by judicial decree should remain a method of accomplishing a
premature dissolution of a fixed term partnership. Section 32 of the UPA lists

210. See supra notes 149-55 and accompanying text.
211. Absent an agreement to the contrary, partners are not entitled to remuneration for services. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 18(o. This is because the partner's compensation is in the form
of distribution of profits. See, e.g., Condon v. Moran, 11 N.J. Super. 221, 224, 78 A.2d 295, 297
(App. Div. 1951). In addition, absent a contrary agreement, partners are not required to perform
services. See Hillman, supra note 41, at 875-78. However, the example discussed in the text suggests
an agreement to perform services. Breach of an express or implied agreement to render services
may result in an adjustment of partnership income allocations. Cf. Miller v. Hale, 96 Mo. App
427, 430, 70 S.W. 258, 259 (1902) (pre-UPA decision noting a partner "may abandon the contract,
and thereby forfeit his right to an equal share of the proceeds of the business").
212. See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT 5 21(1) ("Every partner must account to the partnership for
any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other
partners from any transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the partnership or from any use by him of its property."). Fiduciary principles restrict the ability of a
partner individually to take advantage of business opportunities. See, e.g., Homestake Mining Co.
v. Mid-Continent Exploration Co., 282 F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1960); Stark v. Reingold, 18 N.J.
251, 113 A.2d 679 (1955); Fouchek v. Janicek, 190 Or. 251, 255 P.2d 783 (1950). Dissolution,
on the other hand, may enhance tle ability of a partner to take advantage of partnership opportunities. Although fiduciary principles may restrict in theory the ability of a partner to dissolve in
order to misappropriate partnership opportunities, in practice the effectiveness of this restriction is
open to question. See supra note 165; supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
213. A and C could enjoy the benefit of the sanctions and perhaps add a substitute partner.
In addition, the dissolution may permit the enforcement of a non-competition clause, the validity
of which, in some jurisdictions, may depend upon dissolution of the partnership. See generally note
176.
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a number of grounds supporting a decree of dissolution, '2 4 one of which "circumstances [that) render a dissolution equitable ' 5 - could not be stated
with greater breadth. In practice, courts are reluctant to decree partnership
dissolution in the absence of misconduct by those in control or severe friction
that demonstrably harms business prospects. 2 6 Although consideration of cause
as a standard for judicial dissolution is beyond the scope of this article, greater
flexibility on the subject of cause may be in order, and the very type of expectations-based analysis suggested for use in connection with corporate dis2 7
solution may also prove appropriate when applied to partnerships.
D.

Summing Up

An agreement establishing the duration of a partnership should have the
effect of denying any single partner the power to dissolve the partnership prior
to the expiration of that term. This result may be accomplished by amending
section 31 of the UPA to eliminate as a cause for dissolution the expression
of will in contravention of an existing agreement. Such a reform would permit
meaningful bargaining on the issue of duration and would be consistent with
the general approach of the UPA in permitting partners to establish by agreement, norms for the governance of their businesses.
If partners choose not to accept a term, a terminable at will partnership
would result. Even if a term is established, an early dissolution could result
from other causes unrelated to the advancement of the interests of a single
partner.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The partnership is an unstable and therefore flawed form of business organization. Reflecting a questionable application of agency principles by the
drafters of the UPA, free dissolvability undermines important stability interests
of partners in business ventures. Accordingly, this article has suggested a reform
of the UPA to deprive a partner of the power unilaterally to dissolve a partnership prior to the expiration of its term or completion of its undertaking.
Under this reform, some fixed term partnerships would indeed be "indissoluble." If partners prefer free dissolvability over stability, they need only establish a terminable at will partnership.

214.
215.
216.
217.

See supra note 44.
UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 32().
See generally Hillman, supra note 10, at 544-52.
See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
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